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Abstract  
Humans' capacity to attain knowledge is central to Spinoza's philosophy because, in part, 
knowing things enables humans to deal properly with their affects. But it is not just any sort of 
knowledge that humans should attain. There are different types of knowledge, but only two of 
them–rational and intuitive knowledge–enable humans who attain them to know things clearly. 
Because rational knowledge attends to universals whereas intuitive knowledge attends to 
particulars, intuitive knowledge is better than rational knowledge at enabling humans to deal 
with their affects. Most scholars recognize both the importance of knowledge to humans' dealing 
with their affects and the superiority of intuitive knowledge at enabling them to do this. But these 
points are particularly relevant to the affect that Spinoza calls "tristitia," which is usually 
translated as either "pain" or "sadness." I argue in this dissertation that attaining knowledge–
especially intuitive knowledge–enables humans to deal properly with their experiences of pain. 
This ability that humans acquire by knowing things is what I call "active suffering." A person 
suffers passively when she merely reacts to her pain, in this way allowing an external force to 
control her. She suffers actively when she uses knowledge to respond to her pain, in this way 
being in control of herself. This knowledge she uses to deal actively with her pain bears a 
relation to Spinoza's theory of freedom, since it entails a realization that all events (such as a 
person's experience of pain) happen necessarily and that embracing this necessity is the same as 
being free. 
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Chapter One:  
An Introduction  
The capacity of humans to know things is central to Spinoza's philosophy. The 
geometrical structure of his Ethics reflects this fact, as does his commitment to the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. "For each thing," he writes, "there must be assigned a cause or reason, both 
for its existence and for its nonexistence" (1p1). Perhaps the best example of the significant role 
that knowledge plays in Spinoza's philosophy is his equation of an ethical life with a life guided 
by reason. 
This equation of acting rationally with acting morally indicates the unique way Spinoza 
thinks about human feelings and emotions, both of which he refers to by one word, "affects." He 
thinks about affects as closely related to knowledge. In the preface to Part 3 of the Ethics, he says 
that he intends to consider each matter concerning the affects "just as though it were a question 
of lines, planes, and bodies."  Knowing things is important, he goes on, because doing so enables 
humans to deal properly with their affects.   1
 What I mean by "dealing properly" with affects will become clear, but what I do not mean is 1
that they should be eradicated. Hannan (2009) says that Spinoza is like Schopenhauer in that 
"both philosophers recommend seeking salvation by quieting the passions." This is true of 
Schopenhauer. And some scholars who study Spinoza interpret him as saying the same thing. 
But this interpretation is horribly wrong! Spinoza taught that a person should engage with her 
passions and put them to good use, not "quiet" them. This was perhaps his most important 
philosophical legacy. And it (along with many other insights) places his thinking far closer to 
Nietzsche's than to Schopenhauer's. 
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It is essential not just that humans should know things but also that they should know 
them clearly rather than in a confused way. Spinoza would say that they should acquire adequate 
knowledge rather than inadequate knowledge. There are two types of knowledge that can be used 
to know things adequately: rational knowledge and intuitive knowledge. That both are used to 
know things adequately, however, does not mean that they are equal. Knowing a thing 
adequately is not the same as knowing it completely.  2
To know things rationally is to know about them. Because it involves abstracting away 
from one particular thing, rational knowledge offers a useful way of knowing a thing's universal 
aspects. Due to its abstract nature, though, there are problems with it. Surmounting these 
problems requires going beyond knowing things rationally to knowing them intuitively. To know 
things intuitively is not to know just facts about them but to know their very essences, to know 
them from the inside out. It is to know what a particular thing really is, and from there to know 
facts about it and how it relates to every other thing. We should note that rational knowledge 
constitutes a necessary step: it is impossible to know things intuitively without first knowing 
them rationally. In the end, though, and especially when it comes to enabling humans to deal 
with their affects, intuitive knowledge is superior to rational knowledge. Spinoza writes in Part 5 
of the Ethics that "the greatest virtue of the mind" and "the greatest human 
perfection" lie in knowing things intuitively.  
 Put another way, knowing a thing adequately is necessary but not sufficient to knowing it 2
completely. Both knowing things rationally and knowing things intuitively produce adequate 
knowledge of those things; but it is not the case that they both produce complete knowledge of 
them. 
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Most scholars recognize that, for Spinoza, knowledge is closely related to affects due to 
the fact that knowing things enables humans to deal properly with their affects. Moreover, even 
though the relationship between rational and intuitive knowledge has not received as much 
attention by scholars as it deserves, many do acknowledge that intuitive knowledge is superior to 
rational knowledge at enabling humans to deal properly with their affects. But it is not just 
affects in general that interest me. Rather, I intend to focus here on the affect that Spinoza calls 
"tristitia," which is usually translated as either "pain" or "sadness." The role tristitia plays in 
Spinoza's philosophy as well as the way he proposes that humans should deal with it are two 
areas that have unfortunately been neglected by Spinoza scholars. I intend to take the first step 
towards righting this wrong.  My purpose in this dissertation is to argue that, for Spinoza, 3
knowing things is what enables humans to deal with their experiences of pain  and that knowing 4
things intuitively is the best way of enabling them to do this. These two arguments constitute my 
original contribution to Spinoza scholarship. 
Throughout my dissertation, I refer as "active suffering" to this capacity for dealing with 
pain that humans acquire by knowing things. In other words, I argue that, whenever a person 
 Spinoza was for a long time not much studied among Anglo-American philosophers. In the 3
1960s, however, there was a resurgence, brought about by such scholars as Edwin Curly and 
Jonathan Bennett. They sought to apply Spinoza's philosophy to contemporary problems. My 
purpose in this dissertation is similar.
 Something should be noted here. I mean by "pain" something other than the discomforts that 4
people in societies like mine experience every day. I mean, for example, both the physical and 
psychological pain involved in having a severe disability or terminal illness or in undergoing 
torture or starvation. Of course, the difference between experiencing an instance of everyday 
discomfort and undergoing an instance of intense pain is one of quantity and not of quality. Both 
are examples of tristitia; the latter is just the former multiplied by a thousand. The reason I focus 
on pain in the more serious sense is that looking at the extreme cases of a problem brings its 
potential solution into sharp relief. I want to analyze Spinoza's approach to pain, and the best 
way to do this is to focus on the more extreme cases of pain.
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experiences pain, she should deal with it by suffering actively. There is generally thought to be 
only one way to undergo pain, which involves just letting it happen and involuntarily reacting to 
it. This is the passive way of experiencing pain. The concept is derived from Spinoza's defining a 
thing as "passive" when something that affects a person is caused–either in part or in full–by a 
force external to her. A person suffers passively, then, when she merely reacts to her pain, in this 
way allowing an external force to control her affects. She is totally at the mercy of her pain. But 
there is another way to undergo pain, which involves taking charge of it and responding 
thoughtfully. This is the active way of experiencing pain. The concept is derived from Spinoza's 
defining something that affects a person as "active" if that person herself–in full, not in part–
causes it. A person suffers actively, then, when she responds to her pain rather than merely 
reacting to it, in this way controlling her affects internally. Though she is in pain, she is not at the 
mercy of pain. She uses knowledge to be always in control of herself.  
My argument is that, for Spinoza, knowing things is crucial to being active, which is in 
turn crucial to dealing properly with pain. Included in this argument is Spinoza's observation that 
dealing properly with pain–suffering actively–is the same thing as being free. I include it, 
because being free is part of what it means to suffer actively. According to Spinoza, everything 
that happens–including everything that has happened and will happen–happens of necessity. So 
he defines "freedom" not as a person's capacity to act without being constrained by necessity, 
which is the way freedom is often defined, but as her capacity to determine her actions so that 
they are in accord with necessity. By doing this, she is aligned with the rhythm of life and wants 
whatever happens to happen. As one of the things that constitute life, pain is not just something 
that she tolerates but is something that she wants. And wanting pain–insofar as it is an aspect of 
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life –is not just a a forerunner of dealing properly with pain but is in fact the same thing as 5
dealing properly with it. To suffer actively is to be free. 
I make my argument over the course of five chapters.  
In Chapter 2, I look at Spinoza's view of what it means for humans to exist in the world 
and how they can know about this existence. In other words, I examine his systems of 
metaphysics and epistemology. My primary purpose is to put into context both his metaphysical 
theory of mind-body monism and his epistemological theory of mind-body parallelism, since 
these theories play significant roles in his approach to pain.  
In Chapter 3, I look at the forces of striving and emoting that underlie Spinoza's view of 
being human. In other words, I examine his psychological system–the theories of conatus and of 
the affects. My primary purpose is to put into context his theory of activity and passivity as well 
as that concerning a thing's power of acting, since this theory plays a significant role in his 
approach to pain. 
In Chapter 4, I look at how the specific affect tristitia (pain) takes place and at what 
Spinoza takes to be both the context and the moral quality of this experience. In other words, I 
examine both contemporary pain theory and the way tristitia fits into Spinoza's system of ethics. 
 Let me be quite clear. A person should love pain or want to experience pain only insofar as she 5
has to experience it; by no means am I suggesting that pain should be experienced for its own 
sake. Saying that someone should suffer in order to become a stronger person or saying that 
she should suffer in order to inspire other people are just different ways of saying that she 
should experience pain for its own sake. Moreover, arguing that it is good for people to 
experience pain if it is not necessary for them to do so is not only unethical and cruel but is also 
a slap in the face of every person who has no choice but to experience pain. Even the language 
I use affirms this point: you can't "deal with" something unless you have to experience it. 
Humans should always seek to help other beings–not only humans–who experience pain and 
should always seek to prevent pain whenever it is possible to do so. Only when a person's 
experience of pain cannot be either helped or prevented should it be suffered actively. 
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My primary purpose is to explore both the identity of physical "pain" and psychological 
"sadness" and Spinoza's conclusion as to the moral quality of pain.  
In Chapter 5, I look at the sense in which, according to Spinoza, it is possible for a person 
to be free even though everything happens of necessity. In other words, I examine Spinoza's 
doctrines of necessitarianism and of human freedom. My primary purpose is to shed light on his 
teachings that all existing things are interdependent and that humans can be free, even in the 
midst of pain, by internally determining their actions. 
In Chapter 6, I look at Spinoza's teaching that a person becomes free in the midst of pain 
once she knows both its nature and its relation to the world. I examine his theories of knowledge, 
the ways rational and intuitive knowledge are both similar to and different from each other 
(particularly with regard to pain), and the ways knowledge, activity, and freedom relate to each 
other. My purposes in this chapter are to argue that knowing things enables a person to deal 
properly with pain (i.e. to suffer actively) and that knowing things intuitively is the best way of 
enabling her to do this as well as to show that suffering actively is the same thing as being free in 
the midst of experiencing pain. 
This dissertation is the result of my attempt to look at a very specific piece of Spinoza's 
philosophy–his teaching about tristitia–and to show how it fits into the Ethics as a whole. It is 
also the result of my attempt to discover the best way for a person to deal with her experiences of 
pain. While Spinoza does not address this problem directly–at least in the way I have articulated 
it–much of what he writes in the Ethics and elsewhere can be used to solve it. I intend this 
dissertation to be a part of the solution.  
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Chapter Two:  
Being and Knowing: The Metaphysical and Epistemological Background of Spinoza's 
Doctrine of Active Suffering  
“It is clear through itself that the mind understands itself the better, the more 
it understands of Nature…" (TIE 16).   6
Spinoza's greatest book is The Ethics, and it can indeed be read as a sort of manual that  
proves which is the most logical way for humans to act. But it begins with the metaphysics and 
epistemology on which Spinoza's ethical system–as well as his psychology, religion, and 
politics–relies. It does so because Spinoza does not think that it is possible to offer such proofs 
unless it has first been proved what it is for humans to exist in the world and how they can know 
it.  
As I have said, it is not a problem for Spinoza that humans are composed of body as well 
as of mind. In terms of suffering, a person's mind causes her pain every bit as much as her body 
does. Understanding Spinoza's approach to human suffering requires looking at the relationship 
between  mind and body and, in particular, at what Spinoza means by saying that the two are 
really one.  
 All translations of Spinoza’s writings including the Ethics (E), the Treatise on the Emendation of 6
the Intellect (TIE), and the Short Treatise (KV) are those of Edwin Curley in Spinoza (1985).
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In this chapter, I examine the backbone of Spinoza's system–those two parts on which the 
rest of his philosophy relies. I examine in particular his teachings about the way mind and body 
relate to each other.  
In making this examination, I look first at his metaphysics or his theory of God. This 
discussion includes the way he and his contemporaries (especially Descartes) viewed substance, 
the distinction between dualism and monism (which is divided into different types, including 
Spinoza's substance monism), and the opposition of conceptual to ontological independence. It 
also includes the ways Spinoza and Descartes define attributes, how many attributes each thinker 
posits, and how each thinks these attributes relate to each other. It includes the definition of 
modes, the identity of substance or "God" with the natural world, the role necessitarianism plays 
in Spinoza's modal metaphysics, and why substance must be self-causing. And it includes what 
Spinoza means by saying that a mode is "in" God.  
My examination also includes a look at Spinoza's epistemology or theory of human 
knowledge.  This discussion includes his representationalism, in which a thing's cause and 
essence play vital parts, and the opposition of ontological to epistemological dualism. It also 
includes Spinoza's theory of parallelism and his teaching that my mind as the idea of my body 
along with his definition of an individual and the way his theory of ideas leads to a version of 
panpsychism. And it includes Spinoza's teaching about adequate and inadequate ideas, how they 
apply to his conception of truth, and the controversy among scholars concerning the sense in 
which humans can have adequate ideas.  
This dissertation is concerned with Spinoza's active approach to human suffering, and 
grasping his metaphysics and epistemology is essential to this concern. Equally important is 
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grasping the relation he sees between mind and body. My purpose in this chapter is to enable the 
reader to do these things.  
Spinoza's Theory of God 
Spinoza's concept "God" is not a theological concept based on forming a personal 
relationship with a transcendental creator of the universe.  It is instead a philosophical concept 7
based on attaining a rational understanding of both the universe and humans' place in it. For this 
reason, to grasp the nature of Spinoza's God is to grasp his system of substance monism and the 
parts that comprise it: substance, attributes, and modes.  
Substance 
Central to philosophy in the 17th Century was the problem of the relation between mind 
and body, and the way a philosopher resolved this problem depended on his view regarding the 
nature of substance. Philosophers adhered to either monism or dualism. 
Christian von Wolff first used the term "monism" in his 1728 work Logic to identify a 
way of thinking about reality that opposed mind-body dualism. But monistic thinking dates back 
to the pre-socratic philosophers, who each conceived of reality as consisting of one sort of 
matter. As a philosophical system, monism teaches that everything in existence is fundamentally 
 "There are those who feign a God, like man, consisting of a body and a mind, and7
subject to passions. But how far they wander from the true knowledge of God, is
sufficiently established by what has already been demonstrated" (1p15s). In order to avoid 
confusion, I refer wherever possible to Spinoza's God as "Substance." I also do not personalize 
the pronouns referring to it.
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either one kind of stuff (attributive monism) or one thing (substance monism). Examples of 
attributive monism include idealism and materialism, for both hold that reality consists of one 
kind of stuff (either mental stuff or physical stuff). Spinoza was a substance monist, for he taught 
that only one substance exists and that this substance is infinite.  Leibniz was also a monist, 8
though of the attributive sort. He held that reality is composed of many simple, unextended 
substances called “monads."  9
Descartes, on the other hand, was a dualist in regard to the nature of substance. For him, 
there exist only two kinds substance: one that is characterised by thought and one that is 
characterised by extension. Descartes' works had been widely read by the time Spinoza began 
writing his Ethics. So in developing his theory of substance monism, Spinoza was strongly 
influenced by Descartes. In fact, it has been argued  that Spinoza's metaphysics is a continuation 10
of Descartes' and that Descartes would have been a substance monist if he had followed his own 
premises to their logical conclusion. Although Descartes is known for his dualism and Spinoza 
for his monism , Spinoza’s theory of substance arises directly from both his agreement with and 11
criticism of Descartes' theory.  
They agree, for instance, that a substance is independent of everything else. A substance 
is for Descartes “a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its 
 For a discussion of the way philosophical monism has evolved, see Schaffer 2014. 8
 This is the prevailing interpretation, but the extent to which Leibniz held this view has been 9
debated in recent years. See Garber (2009)
 Notably by Della Rocca (2008) and Curley (1988).10
 Bennet (1963) makes a novel argument that the two do not really differ so much in their 11
thinking about substance. 
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existence” (Principles 1 51).  Spinoza agrees. “By substance,” he says, “I understand what is in 12
itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of 
another thing, from which it must be formed” (1d3). According to these definitions, a substance 
is something that has both ontological and conceptual independence. It is ontologically 
independent in that it does not depend on anything else in order to exist. It is an “ultimate 
metaphysical subject.”  It is conceptually independent in that it is possible to think about (i.e. 13
conceive of) it without thinking about (i.e. conceiving of) anything else. 
For both Descartes and Spinoza, only God is both ontologically and conceptually 
independent. “There is only one substance,” says Descartes, “which can be understood to depend 
on no other thing whatsoever, namely God” (Principles I 51). He goes on to say, though, that it is 
possible for a thing to be independent in one sense and dependent in another. He classifies as a 
substance any finite thing that is conceptually independent of other finite things, even though he 
holds every finite thing to be ontologically dependent on God. To deny that finite things are 
substances would be to characterise them as ways for the substance on which they depend to 
exist. Since Descartes readily admits that God is the substance on which finite things depend, 
denying that finite things are substances would amount to viewing them almost as versions of 
God rather than as God’s creature. Not daring to oppose the traditional doctrines of theism, he 
leaves himself room to say that God is one of many substances.  
But Spinoza does dare. He rejects Descartes’ proposition that a thing can be independent 
in one sense and dependent in another. A substance must be, for him, independent in every way 
 12
 Dutton (2005).13
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that it is possible to be independent. Since finite things depend on God both ontologically and 
conceptually (even though they are conceptually independent of other finite things), they cannot 
be classified as substances. That leaves only one candidate for the role of substance. This 
substance is God.  
Attributes  
An attribute, for both Descartes (Principles I 51) and Spinoza (1d4), is that feature of a 
thing that is essential to it, that makes it what it is. For Descartes, there are only two attributes: 
thought and extension.  He also thinks that, since an attribute is a substance’s essence, each 14
substance can have only one attribute.  
Limiting himself in this way creates a problem for Descartes. As a consequence of 
thinking that there are many substances and that the essence of each substance is either thought 
or extension, he has to figure out how independent attributes of independent substances can 
interact. Descartes continues to this day to be notorious for his inability to offer a suitable answer 
to this question: how is it possible for substance with the sole attribute of thought (i.e. a mind) 
and substance with the sole attribute of extension (i.e. a body) to interact with each other?  
The answer is simple, says Spinoza: they can’t. Against Descartes, he says that there is an 
infinite number of attributes, though a human being can comprehend only thought and extension. 
And he argues that a substance—the one and only substance, for him—can have an infinite 
 More specifically, there are for Descartes two principal attributes. (Principles 1 53)14
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number of attributes.  Spinoza agrees with Descartes that attributes are conceptually 15
independent, but rejects the claim that one attribute can cause changes in another. Even though 
humans think about (i.e. conceive of) thought as independent of extension (e.g. my mind as 
independent of my body), they are not conceiving two different attributes of two different 
substances—as Descartes would have it—but two different dimensions of one substance. 
Attributes, says Spinoza, are the infinite dimensions of the one substance, of God.  16
    
Modes 
Because finite beings are not substances, they cannot have attributes. Only God can. But 
attributes and finite beings are closely connected in that finite beings are modes of the infinite 
substance. “By mode,” says Spinoza, “I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is 
 Leibniz, when he and Spinoza met (cf. Matthew Stewart's book The Courtier and the Heretic), 15
argued against the Second Premise of Spinoza's argument for substance monism (E1p5: “That 
two substances cannot share the same nature or attribute"). He thought that it was possible for 
two substances to share the same attribute but that, because the substances would be 
indistinguishable if they shared all their attributes, each substance also had to have an attribute 
that the other substance did not have. Spinoza found this argument unconvincing but did not 
reply to it. Whiting (2011)
 Spinoza says in E1d4 that “by attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a 16
substance as constituting its essence.”  The Latin here is “per attributum intelligo id, quod 
intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens." There is 
controversy among scholars regarding both the way attributes relate to substance's essence 
and the way they relate to each other. Both controversies hinge on Spinoza's use of the Latin 
word tanquam, which can be translated as either "as" or "as if." Those who read "as" are known 
as the "objectivists." (Most prominent are Curley, 1988 and Della Rocca, 1996.) They take 
Spinoza to mean that a substance has multiple essences and that  intellect correctly perceives it 
as having multiple attributes. Because substance really does have multiple attributes, they are 
distinct from each other. Those who read "as if" are known as the "subjectivists." (Most 
prominent are Wolfson, 1934 and Bennett, 1984) They, on the other hand, take Spinoza to 
mean that a substance has only one essence but that intellect incorrectly perceives it as if it had 
multiple attributes. Because substance only seems to have multiple attributes yet really has only 
one, these seemingly distinct attributes are really identical with each other. 
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in another through which it is also conceived” (1d5). In other words, a substance’s mode is the 
way in which that substance exists. That there are so very many finite beings mean that there are 
so very many ways in which God exists. 
In terms of independence, modes are both ontologically and conceptually dependent on a 
substance; they are expressions of attributes. That they are means that a mode inheres in or is a 
state of its substance. To say the modes are states of a substance is just to say that they are ways 
in which a substance expresses its attributes.  
Spinoza’s God, as the one and only substance, is not a transcendent being  who has 17
created the natural world; he is the natural world (Deus sive Natura). He is identical with nature 
both in its active, substantial form (natura naturans) and in its passive, modal form (natura 
naturata). This identity of God and the natural world, says Spinoza, is like the identity of a 
triangle and its three angles. God expresses his attributes through everything that exists, from the 
laws of the universe (which he calls “infinite and eternal modes”) to all animals, plants, and 
inorganic objects (which he calls “finite and temporal modes”).  
From Spinoza’s conclusion that everything is identical with the one substance it follows 
that everything is interdependent, i.e. that each thing determines and is determined by each other 
thing. “In nature,” he says, “there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined 
from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way”(1p29). 
That everything is both a cause and an effect means that God—the substance with which 
 See 1p17s1: "neither intellect nor will pertains to the nature of God."17
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everything is identical—necessarily exists.  To say that it is necessary for a thing to exist or that 18
it couldn’t not exist is to say that it is caused by (i.e. is the effect of) nothing outside of itself, that 
it is self-caused. Having shown both that everything is identical with the one substance and that 
everything is interdependent, Spinoza has likewise shown that God (i.e. the one substance) 
necessarily exists.  
Modal Dependence  
There is controversy among scholars about the way substance (God) relates to its modes 
(everything else that exists) or by what Spinoza means by saying that "whatever is, is in God." 
According to one interpretation (sometimes called the "inherence interpretation"), to say that 
modes are "in" God is to say that they are states or properties of God.  An extended body or a 19
thinking mind inheres in God in the sense that each is a way God expresses one of his attributes. 
Spinoza seems to support this reading when he says that "particular things are nothing but 
affections of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and 
determinate way" (1p25c). 
This reading seems intuitively correct, but there are problems with it. Pierre Bayle, a 
contemporary of Spinoza, objected that, if everything in existence were a property or state of 
God, then God would be responsible for any wrongdoing.  The more philosophical objection, 20
 See 1p11: "God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses 18
eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists."
For a prominent treatment of the inherence interpretation, see Carriero (1995).19
 For a refutation of this objection and Bayle's other objections to Spinoza's metaphysics, see 20
Guilherme (2009).
 15
which gets to the root of the problem posed by this interpretation, addresses what it means to be 
a state or property of God. If everything that exists is a state or property of God, then how can 
anything have–as everything clearly does have–its own states or properties? 
According to another interpretation (sometimes called the "causal interpretation"), to say 
that modes are "in" God is to say that they are causally dependent on God.  An extended body 21
or a thinking mind inheres in God in the sense that God causes it to exist. Spinoza seems to 
support this reading when he says that "from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow 
infinitely many things in infinitely many modes" (1p16). 
This reading highlights an important aspect of the way substance and modes relate, but it 
overlooks the inherence interpretation altogether. Doing so is a problem, because Spinoza clearly 
says that God expresses his attributes through modes, not that he merely causes them to exist: 
"God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things" (1p18).  
Both of these interpretations are partially correct. Spinoza clearly means by "whatever is, 
is in God" that finite things are states of God and that they are causally dependent on God. 
According to a  third interpretation, which has been proposed by Michael Della Rocca, inherence 
and causal dependence are examples of conceptual dependence. On this reading, inherence just is 
causal and, ultimately, conceptual dependence. To say that one thing inheres in another is to say 
that it is conceived through or intelligible in terms of this other.  This is an effective way of 22
bringing together the dominant but seemingly opposed ways of interpreting Spinoza on modal 
 For a prominent treatment of this interpretation, see Curley (1969).21
 Della Rocca (2008, 68)22
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dependence. Because humans are the modes being emphasised in this dissertation, their relation 
to Spinoza's God is relevant. 
Spinoza's Theory of Human Knowledge  
Spinoza's object in writing about human knowledge is to show people the way to improve 
their natural capacity for reasoning.  His teaching that everything is one substance gives rise to 23
this theory, which anticipates contemporary debates over representationalism, the scientific 
character of psychology, and, what most concerns us here,  the  relation between mind and body. 
It also takes both agreement with and criticism of Descartes' philosophy as its starting point, and 
it relies–as all of Spinoza's thinking does–on naturalism and the PSR.  
Representationalism 
For Spinoza, at the core of the knowledge humans have about their world lies what is 
now known as representationalism : the theory that, when a person perceives something in the 24
external world, she is not directly perceiving that thing but is instead perceiving her own ideas –25
 This is the stated purpose of his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect.23
 See Tye (1997) for a contemporary version of this theory 24
 Spinoza defines "idea" as "a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a 25
thinking thing" (2def3). Furthermore, an idea amounts to an affirmation or negation of 
something. See 2p49s: "Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us 
from encounters with bodies, are convinced that those ideas of things of which we can form no 
similar  image are not ideas, but only fictions which we feign from a free choice of the will. They 
look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a panel, and preoccupied with this prejudice, do 
not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation."
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representations–of that thing.  This makes intuitive sense. When I look at my alarm clock, for 26
instance, I am not perceiving whatever it is that's actually there but rather the thoughts and 
feelings I have about it. Moreover, perceiving my idea of "it" means perceiving both an effect 
and that effect's cause; perceiving a thing in this way is the same as perceiving its essence.  
Given Spinoza's necessitarianism, everything is the effect of another thing. So to have an 
idea of a thing is to have the idea of an effect. The PSR dictates that every effect has a cause. So 
having the idea or representation of a thing actually means having the idea or representation of 
the thing's cause. "For the idea of each thing caused," writes Spinoza, "depends on the 
knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect" (2p7d). He says this again in a letter to 
Tschirnhaus: "the idea or definition of the thing should express its efficient cause" (Letter LX).  27
A cause is that feature of a thing which brings it into existence, which makes it happen. It 
follows that to have an idea of a thing's cause is to have an idea of what that thing fundamentally 
is and of what it is able to do. So to represent a thing's cause means to represent its very essence. 
A thing's essence is for this reason that feature which distinguishes it from every other thing and 
which makes it impossible for two things to share the same essence. This is known as Spinoza's 
"uniqueness of essences". (2def2) That things' essences are unique is, after all, what  it means for 
there to be two things in the first place. 
 Spinoza's theory of ideas has undergone much criticism. Radner (1971) offers a classic 26
treatment. 
 It may be objected that people usually know things without knowing about their causes. 27
Spinoza would say that knowing a thing in that way amounts to not knowing it at all, that such 
knowledge is inadequate knowledge. We shall discuss the difference between adequate and 
inadequate knowledge shortly. 
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It is important to recognise that a thing's essence is unique to that thing, because, for 
Spinoza, to have an idea of a thing is to have an idea of its essence. A thing's essence is that 
which most perfectly stands for what that thing really is and from which, for this reason, it 
cannot be separated.  It is that feature of the thing which, out of all its features, does the best job 28
of explaining it, of making it intelligible and understandable. To ask why a thing has a particular 
essence is as silly as asking why squares have four equal sides. By "a square" is meant or 
understood its essence–the having of four equal sides.  29
It follows that representationalism is for Spinoza nothing more than a method of 
explaining to oneself what things essentially are. I am at this moment looking at my little dog, 
Atticus. Spinoza would say that I am not actually seeing "Atticus" but am rather forming a 
representation of what "Atticus" essentially is. In other words, what I'm actually doing when I 
look at Atticus is explaining or making him understandable to myself.      
Due to his thinking that actions such as mine must be described in this way, Spinoza is a 
dualist. He would say that, in looking at Atticus, I am forming a mental representation of a 
physical object. But Spinoza's dualism  is not at all the same as that of Descartes–it is not 
ontological. Mental things, Descartes says in Meditation VI, are separate and distinct from 
physical things. How the two interact–how, say, I can will my arm to move–is a  mystery to him. 
Spinoza's dualism, on the other hand, is epistemological. In terms of ontology, we have 
already seen that he is a monist. This point is important for his theory of mind-body relation. A 
 See 2def2: "I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is 28
necessarily posited and without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived."
 Della Rocca (2008, 97)29
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mental thing and a physical thing, he says, are by no means separate and distinct things but are in 
fact the same thing. What is different about them concerns not the way they are but the way they 
are known. People just look at one thing from two perspectives–a mental one and a physical 
one.  It is the way  people explain things that is dualistic, not the things themselves. Moving my 30
arm does not consist of a mental act and a physical act. It consists of only one act, which people 
find it useful to explain as two separate acts. 
Parallelism and the Mind as the Idea of the Body  
Spinoza's representationalism plays a central role in explaining what seems to be–but 
really is not–the interaction between mind and body. Recall that, according to Spinoza's theory, I 
am not perceiving the physical thing we're calling my alarm clock but rather my idea of that 
physical thing. Put another way, my mind has no connection with bodies (physical things) but 
only with ideas (mental things).  Spinoza's theory of representationalism is in this way linked 31
with his theory of parallelism. 
In geometrical terms, two lines are said to be parallel if they do not intersect or touch at 
any point. The same rule applies, for Spinoza, to the relation between modes of different 
attributes. It is, as we have seen, impossible for the mode of one attribute (e.g. thought) to 
interact with the mode of another attribute (e.g. extension). Yet the thought-mode and the 
extension-mode are both acting, and, although they do not interact with each other, their actions 
 Spinoza in fact says that one thing can be seen from an infinite number of perspectives. But 30
I–as a human being–know only these two. 
 As we shall see shortly, Spinoza describes the mind as nothing but an idea. 31
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do in fact correspond. Their actions are parallel to each other. This is what is known in the 
literature as Spinoza's "parallelism doctrine": a mental thought (the idea of a thing) and a 
physical object (thing itself) do not act on each other but rather in parallel. "The order and 
connection of ideas," writes Spinoza, "is the same as  the order and connection of things " (2p7). 
Let's take as an example the way my arm moves when I will it to do so. Recall that my mind and 
my body are actually the same thing, so there is no difference between the bodily movement of 
my arm and the idea my mind forms of this movement.  That is the reason it makes no sense to 32
talk about mind and body interacting. But we are discussing epistemology, not ontology. And the 
best way to explain my arm's moving is as my mind and body acting in parallel.   That a person 33
has an idea about a thing (in this case, an idea about my arm's moving) does not mean that either 
the idea or the thing causes the other to exist. The existence of the idea perfectly mirrors the 
existence of the thing (and vice versa), since each in fact is the other seen from a different 
angle.  34
 Unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not see will as a mental faculty separate from ideas. See 32
2p49c: "the will and the intellect are one and the same." My willing something to happen is the 
same as my forming an idea or a representation of its happening. See: Della Rocca (2003).
 See 2p7s: "so long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order 33
of the whole of nature, or the connection of causes, through the attribute of thought alone. And 
insofar as they are considered as modes of extension, the order of the whole of nature must be 
explained through the attribute of extension alone."
 In modal terms, “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, 34
but expressed in two ways” (2p7s). 
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Spinoza's parallelism is linked to his teaching about the mind–that which produces ideas–
being itself an idea : the idea of the body. According to this teaching, my mind, as a mode  of 35
thinking (and not a substance in its own right), is an idea in the mind of God.  So any ideas or 36
representations I form are really God's ideas or representations. Moreover, any idea my mind 
forms is about my body,  as Spinoza writes in the preface to Part V of the Ethics: "the power of 37
the mind is defined by understanding alone." So I perceive external things only only because 
these things affect my body.  38
In other words, whenever my mind forms a representation of something (which action is 
described as mental), my body is performing exactly the same action (now described as 
physical). What I represent to myself–view from one perspective–as my mind, then, is really just 
what I represent to myself–view from another perspective–as my body. Let's say that "I" am 
nameless something x. Spinoza is saying that what I call "my mind" and "my body" are nothing 
more than two ways I represent x to myself.  
 This means that it is not a repository for a person's ideas but is itself the action involved in 35
forming an idea. Let's say that one of my ideas is an affirmation that Atticus is a quadruped. My 
mind or intellect or will just is my affirming, "Atticus is a quadruped." It is for this reason 
impossible that there should be a "will" from which ideas issue out as actions. 
 See 2p11c: "the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore, when we say 36
that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as 
he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as 
he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea."
 I feel or am aware of my own body in a way that I am not aware of any other body. 2ax4, 2ax537
 This point is important for the purposes of this dissertation, as we shall see, because it 38
suggests that the passions play a valuable role in connecting mind and body. See 2p19: "the 
human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that it exists, except 
through the ideas of affections by which the body is affected."
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To say that anything is mine–to say that I have a mind and body–depends on my being 
what Spinoza calls in 2def7 an "individual."  An individual (also called a "singular thing") is a 39
collection of things whose members join together to have certain effects. An individual is thus a 
bunch of things, but these things cannot be isolated. They must form a whole whose parts are not 
disparate but are unified around something. The cells that make up a human heart, for instance, 
are joined together for, unified around, the pumping of blood.  40
In order for my mind and my body to be mine, there must be an "I" with which they are 
identical. This "I," then, cannot be a disparate bunch of things. It has to be an individual, which 
means that its parts have to be unified around something. According to parallelism, what is called 
"my mind" is unified around what is called  "my body." I am an  individual, and my mind is 
unified around the idea of my body.  
From Spinoza's parallelism and the teaching that mind is the idea of the body follows his 
theory of panpsychism.  Since I am a mode of God (i.e. of Substance), both x and any 41
representations my mind forms of it are in God. So my mind (i.e. my idea of my body) is also 
God's idea of my body. This means that the representing of x as "my mind" and "my body" is 
universal. Just as everything has a body, so everything also has a mind.  in other words, all 42
In saying that they are "my" body and "my" mind, Spinoza clearly does not mean that there is 39
a separate "I" which possesses a mind and a body. I am identical with my my mind and my 
body, regardless of the words used to express this identity.
 Other examples of individuals include, as will later be seen, religious bodies (i.e. churches) 40
and political bodies (i.e. states).
 For a discussion of the history of and contemporary arguments for and against panpsychism, 41
see Seager and Allen-Hermanson (2013).
 "For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same 42
way as he is of the idea of the human body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the 
human body must also be said of the idea  of any thing. (2p13s)
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modes have mental representations as well as physical representations. And just as all modes are 
in God, so are all representations of them. It follows that everything–be it I myself, my little dog, 
or my rain-jacket–has a mind (i.e. is conscious).  Of course, not everything is conscious to the 43
same degree. Spinoza points out in 2p12 that, according to parallelism, a person's mind perceives 
everything that is happening inside her body, no matter how minuscule it is.     
For example: despite the fact that a person perceives everything going on in her body, she 
perceives the movement of her arm to a much greater degree than she perceives her liver's 
synthesising of protein. In the same way, although everything is conscious, some things are more 
conscious than others. I, for instance, have a greater degree of consciousness than does my little 
dog, who has a greater degree of it than does my rain-jacket.  44
Adequate and Inadequate Ideas 
Everything Spinoza has said about the human mind–that it is in essence representational, 
that its actions are parallel to those of the human body, that it is itself the idea of its body, and 
that its functions are to some degree universal–points to the distinction he draws between 
adequate and inadequate ideas.  What he means by "adequate" and "inadequate" is best 45
explained by looking again at the way a person perceives objects that are external to her. As we 
 There is some disagreement among scholars about the extent to which, for Spinoza, 43
everything has a mind or is conscious. See Bennett (1984).
 This is the dominant reading. But some scholars, like Wilson (1999), are unwilling to say that 44
Spinoza defines so broadly what it means for a thing to be "mental" or to possess 
consciousness. 
 This distinction is especially important for the purposes of this dissertation, because it is 45
strongly related to his distinction between activity and passivity. 
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have seen, Spinoza says that my mind is the idea of my body and that my body is the only thing 
my mind can perceive. So I rely on my body for perception of anything else that exists. I 
perceive external objects, he says, by perceiving their effects on my body. But there's more to it 
than this.  
He goes on to say that I perceive the condition of my own body more clearly than I do 
that of an external object.  And this is so because a person is naturally more "confused" about 46
something going on outside of her than she is about something going on inside of her.  In his 47
words, perceptions of internal objects are "adequate ideas" while perceptions of external objects 
are "inadequate ideas." For anything to be adequate (as opposed to inadequate), it has to be the 
complete cause of itself (like my idea of my body) and cannot depend on anything else. 
The distinction is especially important, because Spinoza identifies inadequate ideas with 
falsehood and adequate ideas with truth. Inadequate ideas proceed from sense experience alone, 
so they cannot offer the  order and oversight of reason.  Someone whose knowledge is 48
inadequate has for this reason a false view of things and of the way they work.  Adequate ideas, 49
 "The ideas which we have of external bodies indicate the condition of our own bodies more 46
than the nature of external bodies" (2p16c2).  
 See 2p29s, where Spinoza identifies this confusion with the having of inadequate ideas.47
 The word "alone" is important, because all our ideas proceed from sense experience. The 48
point is that reason as well as sense experience is needed. 
See 2p29c: "As long as the human mind perceives things from the common order of nature, it 49
does not have an adequate, but only a confused and mutilated knowledge of itself, of its own 
body, and of external bodies."
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however, proceed from sense experience that is tempered by reason.  So a person who has 50
adequate knowledge sees things as they truly are.  Spinoza explains this distinction in terms of 51
three types of knowledge: opinion, reason, and intuition. The first type, opinion, enables a person 
to know things only inadequately. The second and third types, reason and intuition, however, 
enable a person to know things adequately. We shall look closely at Spinoza's three types of 
knowledge in Chapter 5. 
The Problem of Adequate Ideas  
There is controversy among scholars concerning whether or not it is possible for humans 
to have adequate ideas.  Michael Della Rocca, in his Representation and the Mind-Body 52
Problem in Spinoza, articulates a version of the position that it is not possible.  He does admit 53
that Spinoza says in more than one passage that it is possible for humans to have adequate 
ideas.  But then he asserts that there is a problem: the requirements Spinoza places on having 54
 See 2p43s: "A true idea means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly, or in the best 50
way." See also Letter 60: "Between a true and an adequate idea I recognize no difference but 
this, that the word ‘true’ has regard only to the agreement of the idea with its object (ideatum), 
whereas the word ‘adequate’ has regard to the nature of the idea in itself. Thus there is no real 
difference between a true and an adequate idea except for this extrinsic relation.”
 And not only things themselves but also how and why they are that way. As we shall see later, 51
this is because knowing things adequately enables us to understand their part in the causal 
nexus and to know that they happen necessarily. 
 This topic is important for this dissertation, because my argument concerns Spinoza's method 52
of active suffering. And a person's being able to do anything actively necessitates her having 
adequate ideas.
 Other versions include Bartuschat (1994), who accuses Spinoza of failing to explain how 53
adequate ideas can be "in us" in any meaningful sense. 
See 2p38c: "There are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men...which must be perceived 54
adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all." See also 2p47: "The human mind has an adequate 
knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence."
 26
adequate ideas make it impossible for humans actually to have them. "In order for a certain idea 
that the human mind has to be adequate," he writes, "the human mind must include all the ideas 
that are the causal antecedents of this idea. How could the human mind, in any particular case, 
have all these ideas?” 
There are two problems with this position. One is that it fails to consider that, according 
to Spinoza, there are two distinct kinds of mode: finite modes and infinite modes. Whereas finite 
modes–because they are limited by duration–have an infinite chain of causal antecedents, infinite 
modes–because they are not limited by duration–do not. So it is possible for humans to have 
adequate ideas of common notions  and of God's essence  (both of which are infinite modes). It 55 56
is even possible for humans to have adequate ideas of the essences of finite modes, since Spinoza 
says that the essence of a finite mode is infinite  (and so is not limited by duration ).  57 58
 These are intrinsic properties that modes of an attribute have in common. See 2p38c: "There 55
are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men...which (by P38) must be perceived 
adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all." Though scholars usually talk about common notions 
in reference to modes of extension (e.g. motion and rest), modes of thought can just as well be 
characterised as common notions. This is because, according to parallelism, there is no 
difference between a mode of thought and a mode of extension. 
 See 2p47: "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite 56
essence" (2p47).
 See 2p8: "...the formal essences of the singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s 57
attributes." See also 2p8c: "When singular things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are 
comprehended in God’s attributes, but insofar also as they are said to have duration, their ideas 
also involve the existence through which they are said to have duration."
 He says explicitly in 5p29s that a thing can be conceived either as it exists in duration or 58
through its duration-less essence: "We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as 
we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them 
to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But the things we 
conceive in this second way as true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and their 
ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God."
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It seems logical to say that humans can have adequate ideas, and many Spinoza scholars 
take this conclusion for granted without seeing the need to argue for it directly. Eugene Marshall 
even argues  that adequate are innate to the human mind, because I cannot perceive an external 59
object (a hockey puck, to use his example) without having basic knowledge of it (like motion 
and rest). My perceiving the puck does not give me this knowledge; it is only the occasion for 
applying ideas that are innate to my mind. Regardless of some scholars' doubts, Spinoza plainly 
says that humans can have adequate ideas. Moreover, important parts of his philosophy hinge on 
their possessing this capacity. The problem of adequate ideas turns out, I think, to be no problem 
at all.  
I conclude that grasping the parts of Spinoza 's metaphysics and epistemology that I have 
presented in this chapter–in particular his view of the relation  between mind and body–is crucial 
to understanding his argument about active suffering. Moreover, it is essential to understanding 
the relevant points of his psychological theory, which is the subject of the next chapter.  
 See Marshall (2008)59
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Chapter Three: 
Striving and Feeling: The Psychological Foundations of Active Suffering  
What it is for humans to be and to know gives way to what it is for them to strive and to 
feel. Striving is more particularly an extension of Spinoza's metaphysics (of being), and feeling 
is an extension of his epistemology (of knowing). Both striving and feeling are important to the 
ways in which humans express themselves. For this reason, understanding Spinoza's 
psychological system requires understanding what it means to strive and to feel.  
More to the point is the fact that, for Spinoza, humans are composed of body as well as of 
mind. As I have said, it is both a person's mind and body that causes her pain. So it is necessary 
to look at Spinoza's view of the relationship between  mind and body and, in particular, the 
relationship between the affects and rational cognition.  
In this chapter, I examine Spinoza's psychological system–his theories of conatus and of 
the affects–and focus especially on the relationship for him between reason (traditionally 
associated with mind) and the affects (traditionally associated with body). I look first at his 
theory of conatus.  First, he asserts that there is universal kinship: everything is equally a part of 
nature, and  humans are no exception. Second, what is essential to everything is that it strives to 
keep on existing. Spinoza calls this characteristic a thing's conatus, and says that it reflects the 
thing's power of acting. So striving to persevere in being is not just maintaining the status-quo 
but trying endlessly to increase one's power of acting. Third, conatus relates in a surprising way 
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to consciousness. It is not merely organisms with big brains or high levels of consciousness that 
engage in such activity. It is all  living beings, who represent this striving to themselves in terms 
of both teleology and mechanism. I then look at his theory of the affects. First, affects are for 
Spinoza both emotions and feelings. In keeping with his parallelism, the affects are both mental 
and physical. But humans conceive of them as heading two separate categories.  An affect in the 
form of a bodily sensation is currently called an emotion, and an affect in the form of a mental 
representation is called a feeling. Second, affects, being manifestations of a thing's conatus, 
reflect its power of acting. In a related (but not identical) way, affects are either active or passive. 
Third, reason can transform the affects from passive to active by taking on the form of an affect, 
becoming affective reason. 
Understanding the arguments I am going to make about Spinoza's approach to human 
suffering requires a person to understand both his psychological system and the affective aspect 
of the relationship between mind and body. My purpose in this chapter is to enable the reader to 
understand these concepts.  
Theory of Conatus  
Every being has within it something that makes it strive to keep on existing. This 
observation briefly summarises Spinoza's conatus doctrine and is important for the purposes of 
this dissertation in two ways. First, it shows that behaving in an active way is part of any being 's 
nature. Second, it shows that human emotions–including painful ones–are manifestations of 
humans' striving. Understanding both applications of Spinoza's conatus doctrine is essential to 
understanding his teaching about active suffering.  
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Universal Kinship  
A logical consequence of substance monism is that everything lies within the natural 
order,  i.e. that nothing falls outside of nature's bounds. Spinoza describes this universal kinship 
in the preface to Part III of his Ethics: 
The laws and rules of nature, according to which all things happen and change from one form to 
another, are always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature of 
anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, viz. through the universal laws of nature. 
This dissertation is concerned with Spinoza's approach to human suffering. In order to address a 
matter that relates specifically to humans, however, it is necessary to acknowledge that, for 
Spinoza, a human being is but one mode among the many modes expressing the one substance's 
attributes. That is, humans are not different from the world around them and are not exceptions 
to its rules;  they constitute only one part of the vast natural system and and are, along with its 60
 Also in the Preface to Part III Spinoza says that "they [most writers on the emotions] appear to 60
conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom : for they believe that he 
disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and 
that he is determined solely by himself." Kisner (2011) points out that Spinoza refers in the TP to 
the "kingdom within a kingdom" as applying specifically to human freedom. Many people think of 
humans as untouched by finite causes and therefore not subject to necessity. We'll look at 
necessitarianism more closely in another chapter, but for now I want to show that Spinoza's 
teaching of universal kinship bears on his discussion of human freedom and hence on his 
approach of active suffering. 
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other inhabitants, subject to its governance.  Their peers are plants, minerals, animals of other 61
species, as well as laws of nature and of the universe.  
Conatus and the Power of Acting  
I have said that, for Spinoza, everything has within it something that makes it strive to 
keep on existing. The reason is that this something is the essence of everything. So in striving to 
keep on existing a thing is just doing what is most essential to it. In Spinoza's terms, each sort of 
being mentioned above–humans, other animals, plants, minerals, natural laws–is a mode of God 
and as such expresses God's essence. And in God's essence lies God's power.  So, in its act of 62
expressing God's essence, each mode is at the same time expressing God's power. God's essence 
or power is in this way identical with the essence or power of God's modes. Moreover, this is not 
simply one feature among many features that a being possesses. As the principle by which a 
mode expresses God's essence,  it constitutes the mode's essence as well. The essence of every 63
mode manifests itself as what Spinoza calls a mode's conatus. 
 It is sometimes argued that humans are more important than other beings because they have 61
certain characteristics (e.g. reason, consciousness, personality) that other beings either lack 
entirely or do not have to the same degree. Spinoza's point is that it doesn't matter which 
characteristics a particular being (such as a human) has, because every characteristic is a 
manifestation of a being's conatus, which is something that every being has. So humans are not 
more important than other beings, because they are not really different from them. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the relation between humans and Spinoza's Conatus doctrine, see 
Lebuffe (2015).  
 See 1p34: "From the sole necessity of the essence of Gof it follows that God is the cause of 62
himself and of all things. Wherefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is 
identical with his essence."
 See 3p7: "The striving by which each thing seeks to persevere in its being is nothing but the 63
thing's actual essence."
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The etymology of conatus sheds light on its meaning and function in Spinoza's 
philosophy. "Conatus" is a perfect passive participle that  derives from the Latin verb conor 
(which means "to endeavour") and was first used (along with the Greek hormē) by Hellenistic 
philosophers to indicate the soul's moving toward an object and the physical state that results 
from this movement. Used by thinkers throughout the histories of both metaphysics and physics, 
conatus has been translated into English as effort, endeavour, impulse, inclination, tendency, 
undertaking, and striving.  Descartes modernised the concept and used it to refer in a purely 64
physical sense to the tendency of an object to persevere in existence.  Hobbes did so as well.  65 66
Spinoza, not (like Descartes) viewing the mind as  separate from other physical objects, applied 
it to human emotions in particular and to every being's psychology in general. He describes it 
this way: "Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being" (3p6) 
It is important to recognise that striving to keep on existing or to persevere in being 
carries within it a striving to enhance that existence or being. In other words, striving to exist is 
not separate from striving to make that existence better. Rather, striving to make existence better 
is what it means to strive to exist.  Existing or “persevering in being” is in a way equivalent 67
 Interestingly, Hassing (1980) argues that Spinoza's particular way of conceiving conatus does 64
not derive from physics but comes instead from the ancient teaching of eudaimonia and the 
related theory of the soul.  
 See Garber (1994).65
 LeBuffe (2006)66
 A problem in understanding this point arises from thinking that striving to survive means 67
something different from and inferior to striving to live (to enhance one's life). An example is the 
film WALL-E, in which the spacecraft's commander says, "I don't want to survive. I want to live." 
What he means is heroic, but he uses the wrong words. The nature of life makes it impossible 
for "survive" and "live" to have different meanings. I can't try to survive without at the same time 
trying to live. See Yovel (2001).
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with not being destroyed. But not being destroyed is hardly a simple, straightforward 
accomplishment. In order for a thing to exist, it must do more than maintain the status quo. It 
must have an internal ambition to prevail against all odds and make itself better and better. That's 
why I say "strive to keep on existing" and why Spinoza says "strive to persevere in existence.” 
A thing's conatus, then, is not its striving to maintain the status quo but rather its striving 
to enhance itself. Another way of describing a being's conatus is as a constant striving to be able 
to perform more and more activities. In Spinoza's terms, by striving to persevere in its being a 
thing is striving to increase its power of acting. It acts (or is active) when it brings about an effect 
through its own capacities. Its power of acting is its ability to be the cause of effects. This ability, 
this power of acting, is part of what it means to be.  As such, Spinoza equates a being's power of 68
acting with its happiness and self-fulfilment. An increase or decrease in a being's power is the 
same thing as its becoming more or less happy.  
Conatus and Consciousness 
It seems that striving to persevere in being or to keep on existing (and to enhance that 
existence) should require a great level of consciousness. How else is a being to know what will 
enable it to survive and thrive as well as where it should go and what it should do to realise these 
goals? Actually, these goals are automatic to every being, as are the means it employs for 
 What Spinoza calls "conatus" Schopenhauer calls “the will to life” (der Wille zum Leben) and 68
Nietzsche calls “the will to power” (der Wille zur Macht). As with the striving to exist and the 
striving to enhance existence, the three are inseparable: having a conatus is the same as 
having a will to live, which is the same as having a will to increase one’s power. Egyed (2007) 
makes a similar argument but also points out that Schopenhauer denies this will whereas 
Spinoza and Nietzsche affirm it. 
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realising them. In order to persevere in its being, a thing does not need to be conscious or even to 
possess any sort of brain at all. It needs only to strive. That everything has this within it this 
inclination to strive can be seen in even the simplest organisms, such as the paramecium. 
Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio asks his readers to picture this unicellular organism swimming 
in its bath. Though it has no brain, it detects and avoids danger in the process of locating the best 
available nutrients. Every living being, he points out, engages in what is at bottom the same 
behavior: “detection of the presence of an object or event that recommends avoidance and 
evasion or endorsement and approach” (40).   The ability to engage in such behavior is not 69
taught to organisms but is genetically hardwired into them. That it is, he says, “shows that nature 
has long been concerned with providing living organisms with the means to regulate and 
maintain their lives automatically, no questions asked, no thoughts needed” (41). 
Because this striving is inherent and automatic, it requires the possession neither of 
consciousness nor even of any brain at all.  So it can be said that a  paramecium or a dandelion 70
or a grain of sand strives to persevere in its being. Many beings do of course possess brains, 
some of which are quite complicated. But they, no less than the paramecium, manifest the basic 
characteristics of internal ambition: identification of things that ought to be either avoided or 
approached.  
 Everything in existence--from my refrigerator to a park bench to the stone lying in the middle 69
of the road--is, fundamentally speaking, a living being. That is, everything is composed of 
particles that are in themselves living beings. So everything is characterised by Spinoza's 
conatus and hence cannot help but strive to persevere in its being. This teaching and others like 
it, Spinoza has been influential in the deep ecology movement. For a discussion of the 
connection between Spinozist and ecological thought, see Naess (1977). For an alternative 
view, see Kober (2013).
 As Curley (1990) points out, the Latin verb conatus could just as well be translated "to tend," 70
which would clearly imply that no conscious effort is involved in striving.
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It may be objected that beings with complicated brains do a lot more than detect and 
evade danger in the process of locating nutrients. Though this seems to be the case, however, it is 
true only superficially. Behind the love affairs, the displays of aggression or fear, and the 
arguments of all sorts in which these complicated beings engage lies the same striving that lies 
behind the actions of every being. In humans, who possess brains that are very complicated, it 
motivates everything from political races to scientific discoveries to works of art. 
Conatus and Teleology  
An important issue in 17th-century philosophy was whether to give the actions of beings 
a  teleological or a mechanistic explanation. Do beings perform an action in order to achieve an 
end (final cause of the action) or because they are put together in such a way that their parts 
perform the action in question (efficient cause of the action). Being a firm mechanist, Descartes 
rejects final causes throughout all of natural philosophy.  In contrast, Leibniz thinks that 71
everything can be explained in two ways: both in terms of efficient causation and in terms of 
final causation.   72
 See Principles 1:28: “It is not the final but the efficient causes of created things that we must 71
inquire into... So we shall entirely banish from our philosophy the search for final causes." See 
also Meditation 4: "The customary search for final causes is totally useless in physics."
 See "A Specimen of Dynamics": “All existent facts can be explained in two ways—through a 72
kingdom of power or efficient causes and through a kingdom of wisdom or final causes." He 
goes on to say that “the way of final causes” is often useful in “divining important and useful 
truths which one would be a long time in seeking by the other, more physical way [presumably, 
the way of efficient causes].” 
 36
Spinoza clearly rejects a teleological explanation of the natural world. God/Nature does 
not act in order to achieve an end but simply because that is the way Nature is put together.  But 73
there is controversy among scholars concerning the extent to which Spinoza rejects teleological 
explanation. Does his rejection of divine providence entail a rejection of all teleological 
explanation , including both unthoughtful teleology (the Aristotlean doctrine that all living 74
things pursue ends, even if they do not choose them rationally) and thoughtful teleology (the idea 
that human actions are purposive)? 
Some scholars–notably Bennett (1983)–argue that it does. According to him, Spinoza's 75
conatus argument does not  suggest that humans (and all other beings) strive in order to 
persevere in being but that their striving is simply a consequence of the way their parts are 
organised.  Bennett cites Spinoza's reducing of human actions to the concept of biological 
appetite.  A person no more walks across the room in order to get a glass of water than the 76
levers of a watch work together in order to indicate the correct time. Humans act, just as watches 
do, because that is the way humans are put together.   All human actions, says Bennett, should be 
Spinoza makes this clear in the Appendix to Part 1 of the Ethics: "Not many words will be 73
required to show that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but 
human fictions."
 It is important to draw a distinction here between the parts of nature (whose mechanistic or 74
teleological nature is disputed) and nature as a whole (the non-teleological nature of which is 
undisputed).
 Another example is Greetis (2010), who agrees that Spinoza rejects all forms of teleology but 75
argues against Bennett that this rejection is consistent with the rest of his philosophy. 
 See the preface to Part 4 of the Ethics: "What is termed a final cause is nothing but human 76
appetite in so far as it is considered as the starting‐point or primary cause of some thing. For 
example, when we say that being a place of habitation was the final cause of this or that house, 
we surely mean no more than this, that a man, from thinking of the advantages of domestic life, 
had an urge to build a house. Therefore, the need for a habitation in so far as it is considered as 
a final cause, is nothing but this particular urge, which is in reality an efficient cause."
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understood mechanistically and not teleologically: we do what we do because, given Spinoza's 
necessitarianism, it is impossible for us not to.   
Other scholars–notably Garrett (1999)–argue that Spinoza's rejection of divine teleology 
does not entail a rejection of all teleological explanation.  Evidence that Spinoza views human 77
action as goal-oriented, says Garrett, ies in informal statements  as well as in the structure of his 78
moral psychology.  Moreover, he argues that Spinoza uses the concept of appetite to explain the 79
correct ordering of a teleological account of human action. A person's end in walking across the 
room is not the glass of water itself but her representation of it (her idea, for instance, that it will 
quench her thirst). Since it occurs before rather than after the action, this Spinozistic version of 
an end is explainable in mechanistic terms. This explanation of a teleological account's correct 
ordering, says Garrett, applies to Spinoza's conatus argument. The object of striving is the 
representation of perseverance in being, which can, because it occurs before the striving, be 
explained mechanistically.  
Whether Spinoza characterises human striving (and the striving of all other beings) in 
mechanistic or teleological terms is not important only for the interpretation of his conatus 
argument but also for the interpretations of his ontology and moral psychology. It seems to me, 
however, that there is not really an important difference between the two interpretations. Beings 
 Curley (1990) is another notable proponent of this position, as are Lin (2006) and Manning 77
(2001).
 See another section of the appendix to Part 1: "All prejudices I here undertake to expose 78
depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as men do, on 
account of an end."
 See 3p28: "We strive to further the occurrence of whatever we imagine will lead to joy, and to 79
avert or destroy what we imagine is contrary to it, or will lead to sadness." 
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pursue ends (whether thoughtfully or unthoughtfully), and they do so because that is the way 
they're put together. This unification of efficient and final causation is not new,  and Spinoza's 80
development of it–most obviously in his doctrine of parallelism–has been recognised by other 
scholars.  81
Theory of the Affects 
Spinoza's theory of the affects is the centrepiece of his psychology. Although earlier 
thinkers such as Descartes, Hobbes, and the Stoics influenced him in forming this theory, he, 
unlike them, is determined to view humans' feelings and emotions–their affects–as parts of 
nature and as governed by its laws and by causal necessity. In keeping with this view, he regards 
the affects as expressions of humans' striving to persevere in existence.  
Affects as Both Feelings and Emotions  
An affect, says Spinoza in Def. 3 of Part 3, is two things. First, it is something which 
makes it so that "the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained." This 
means that an affect relates to a mode under the attribute of extension (i.e. to a body). An affect 
 Lagerlund (2011) argues that the unification of efficient and final causality maps onto the 80
unification of mind and body and that this unification began in the fourteenth century. Such 
thinkers as William Ockham and John Buridan introduced a more mechanical view of reality, 
which explained the natural world in terms of efficient causation and relegated final causation to 
the human mind. 
 Carriero (2005), although he recognises that it is Spinoza's object to unify efficient and final 81
causation, thinks that he has difficulties doing so. 
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is also "the idea of" this something.  This means that an affect relates to a mode under the 82
attribute of thought (i.e. to a mind). So I experience an affect when my body undergoes a change 
in its power and my mind simultaneously forms an idea of this power-changing event.  In other 83
words, "affect" could refer either to a bodily sensation or to a mental representation of that 
sensation. Spinoza's parallelism dictates that these two ways of conceptualising "affect"–as either 
mental or physical–are in fact one way: an affect is both mental and physical.  
What Spinoza calls "affect" is usually called both "feeling" and "emotion." The current 
term in psychology for a bodily sensation is "emotion," which is a response to an external event.  
Emotions occur in the subcortical regions of a person's brain and alter her physical state by 
sending biochemical messages to her body.  The term for a mental representation of it is 84
"feeling," which is a person's response to her emotion that occurs in the neocortical regions of 
her brain. A feeling is the mind's idea or representation of whatever emotional state the body is in 
at a given time.   85
As a consequence of this representational relation, emotions precede feelings. 
Experiencing something causes a person to react emotionally and then to have feelings about her 
emotions. If I eat a spoonful of mint-chocolate-chip ice cream, for instance, my body will be in a 
 See 3def3: "By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting 82
is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these f."
 See 3p11: "Anything that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body’s power of 83
acting, also increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind’s power of thinking."
 See Griffiths (1997) for a discussion of the commonly accepted way to distinguish and classify 84
emotions. 
 See Damasio (2000) for a discussion of feelings as maps a person creates to chart her body's 85
emotional states. 
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state of pleasure (as evidenced by the endorphins rushing to my brain, the smile appearing on my 
face, and many other emotional states of my body–visible as well as not-so-visible). Following 
my body's emotions of pleasure are my mind's representations of these emotions: my feelings of 
joy.  86
Spinoza's affects correspond to mind and body in the same way that feelings and 
emotions do. As the three primary affects–joy (laetitia), sadness (tristitia), and desire 
(cupiditas) –make clear, an affect for him is the body's striving together with the mind's 87
consciousness of striving. The same is true of the forty-eight other affects he discusses, such as 
love, hatred, and longing. These are all combinations of the primary three together with the 
influence of some cognitive state.  Let's see an example of the way an affect combines the 88
actions of mind and body.   When I strive after something (which striving of the body he calls 
"appetite"), I am, based on a number of factors, either more or less likely to achieve my goal. If I 
am conscious that I am striving (which striving of the mind he calls "desire"), everything 
 This is by no means to say that emotions cause feelings. Since–as Spinoza would say–the 86
body and its emotions are really no different from the mind and its feelings, there is no causal 
relation here. Feelings do not cause emotions, any more than emotions cause feelings. Feelings 
and emotions are two ways of representing one thing.
 These present a problem for translators. Since a Spinozistic affect is both an emotion and a 87
feeling, should the relevant emotion-words (pleasure, pain, and appetite) or the relevant feeling-
words (joy, sadness, and desire) be used? Most scholars follow Curley's "joy" and "sadness." 
Others follow Shirley's "pain" and "pleasure." Bennett prefers "pleasure" and "unpleasure." I 
myself side with Curley, since Spinoza's concern in Part 3 is with the affects' psychological 
dimension. 
 See 3def48, in which all affects are said to be "nothing but these three [desire; joy or 88
pleasure; and sadness or pain], each one generally being called by a different name on account 
of its varying relations and extrinsic denominations." For instance, love and hatred are joy and 
pain together with awareness of the affect's object. Longing is desire together with memory of 
the object. 
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changes. It then becomes my desire to achieve my goal, and that "more or less likely" turns into a 
profusion of feelings and emotions.  89
Affects and the Power of Acting: Active and Passive 
Recall from Section 2.1 that a being's conatus can defined as its striving to increase its 
power of acting (i.e. to enhance its capacity to perform activities). Affects are manifestations of 
this striving. It is possible to look at a person (and with more effort at any other being) and to 
say, based on the affect she is displaying, either "her power of acting is being increased" or "her 
power of acting is being decreased.”  90
The fact that affects are manifestations of a person's striving is what connects them to her 
power of acting. Another way of saying that a person's power of acting is increased rather than 
decreased is to say that she is more active and less passive.  She is now better able to act on her 91
own (more active) without relying on anything external (less passive). The same is true of an 
affect. It is more active if it enables the person experiencing it to feel things on her own and more 
passive if it causes her to rely on other things to determine the way she feels. For example, I feel 
 Since every being is conscious to a degree–given Spinoza's panpsychism–every being is to a 89
degree able to desire things. Perhaps Spinoza focuses in Part III on human psychology and 
human desires because, since humans are more conscious than are other beings, their desiring 
is magnified. 
 See 4pref: "...when I say that somebody passes from a state of less perfection to a state of 90
greater perfection, I mean… that we conceive his power of activity, insofar as this is understood 
through his nature, to be increased or diminished."
 It is important to notice that Spinoza recognises gradations of activity and passivity. As his 91
language of increase/decrease and greater/less perfection indicates, no affect is absolutely 
active or passive. When, for example, Spinoza calls an affect "active " he means only that it is 
more active than passive. Harris (2012) offers further discussion of this issue. 
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passive joy when I gaze at a sunset, because the sun's setting is what (in part) causes me to 
experience the affect joy. When I cause myself to feel joy (i.e. I am not feeling it due to the sun's 
setting or to any other event outside me), I experience active joy. In other words, whether an 
affect is active or passive depends on the way it influences a person's power of acting. The more 
it increases her power of acting (i.e. the more powerful it enables her to become), the more active 
it is. The more it decreases her power of acting (i.e. the less powerful it makes her), the more 
passive it is. 
This relationship between a person's power and her degree of activity raises what is 
sometimes called "the problem of passive joy." According to Spinoza, a thing is passive if its 
actions are determined by external causes and is characterised by joy if its power of acting is 
increased. As I have said, a thing's activity/passivity is related to an increase/decrease of its 
power but is not identical to it. It seems unproblematic, given these definitions, for a thing to be 
both passive and characterised by joy.  Yet some scholars do not think it is. They argue that, if a 92
thing's action is determined by an external cause, that thing's power of acting cannot undergo an 
increase. Only a thing whose actions are determined by it's own power–an active thing–can, they 
claim, undergo an increase in its power of acting. 
The resolution of this controversy depends on something deeper than a controversy about 
how to define a particular affect; it addresses one of this dissertation's main issues, which is 
whether human passivity should be regarded in a positive or negative light. I shall delve more 
deeply into this issue in Chapter 5. 
 See 3p58: "Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy 92
and desire which are related to us insofar as we act."
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Most of the affects that Spinoza discusses are passive, because most of a person's feelings 
and emotions are caused by external stimuli. Despite this fact, some scholars paint the passive 
affects as bad and the active affects as good.  One reason for doing this is that Spinoza 93
categorises activity with adequacy  and passivity with inadequacy. A more important reason is 94
that he plainly identifies being governed by the passive affects (or "passions") with being in a 
state of bondage.  Yet I don't think that Spinoza attributes greater value to active affects than to 95
passive ones or that he regards passive affects as bad. He says this plainly in the Preface to Part 
3, where he contradicts those people who say that what humans feel and emote "is opposed to 
nature and is vain, absurd, and horrifying." He argues instead that "in Nature nothing happens 
which can be attributed to its defectiveness," that having emotions and feelings is a natural part 
 For example, Dutton (2005) says that Spinoza "vilifies" the passions, and Nadler (2001) says 93
that he is trying to "expurgate" them. It is true that, when I write a paper or lift weights, I perform 
the task more actively the more of my own power I put into it. But who is to say that that means I 
perform it better?
 See 3p1: "Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has 94
adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily 
passive." Recall from Chapter 1 the distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas, which 
pertains to the way a person perceives something external. To have an adequate idea of it is to 
perceive it clearly and distinctly, and to have an inadequate idea of it is to perceive it in a 
confused and unclear way. Having an adequate/inadequate idea is a lot like experiencing an 
active/passive affect, because both qualifications are concerned with the extent to which a 
person uses her own power when interacting with things outside her. 
  See 4p4: "It is impossible that man should not be a part of nature, and that he should be able 95
to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his nature alone, and of 
which he is the adequate cause. From this it follows that man is necessarily always subject to 
passions, that he follows and obeys the common order of Nature, and accommodates himself to 
it as much as the nature of things requires."
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of being human, and that humans should seek to understand them through "the universal laws 
and rules of Nature."   96
Affective Reason  
Spinoza's distinction between between active and passive affects is especially important 
when it comes to his discussion of what scholars call "affective reason." Spinoza makes it clear 
that he intends to treat the affects in the same rational and "geometrical" way that he treats 
everything else in his philosophy.  But what exactly does this mean? According to some 97
scholars, Spinoza is pointing out that reason has the capacity to transform affects that are passive 
and inadequate into affects that are active and adequate.  Other scholars argue that, since 98
Spinoza thinks that affects are too powerful to be changed by reason, a rational treatment of the 
affects means that humans should eliminate their passions as far as possible.  99
This debate concerning the role of reason in the affects seems senseless to me. Of course 
Spinoza says that affects are too powerful to be changed by reason.  He never suggests, though, 100
that humans should transform their affects by studying theoretical physics! That is, the mere act 
of reasoning about something–particularly something that is unrelated to the affects–is not by 
 In Chapter 3, I shall discuss in more detail the normative status of passive affects–particularly 96
that of sadness (tristitia). In Chapter 5, I shall offer a more in-depth argument that recognising 
the importance of the passions plays a significant role in Spinoza's doctrine of active suffering. 
 See 3pref: "I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, 97
planes, and bodies."
 See for example Lloyd (2003) and Kisner(2013).98
 See for example LeBuffe (2001) and Nadler (2001).99
 Bennett (1985, 286) points this out. See 4def14:  "No affect can be restrained by the true 100
knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect."
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itself enough to transform affects.  As Lloyd writes,"the whole point is that reason engages 101
with what the mind is currently undergoing" (39). Spinoza's argument is that it is only another 
affect–not reason itself–that is powerful enough to transform affects.  In other words, reason 102
influences affects by taking on the form of an affect. Reason thereby becomes what I like to call 
"embodied understanding.” 
This convergence of rationality and affectivity , Lloyd (2003, 42) points out, can be 103
seen in Spinoza's treatment of "that elusive form of joy" that he calls hilaritas.  According to 104
her it is an example of a "reflective pleasure" or a "pleasure of reason." In other words, hilaritas 
represents reason taking on the form of an affect and thereby acquiring the capacity to transform 
passions into active affects.  105
It should be noted here that Spinoza's rational transformation of the passions is quite 
different from Descartes's manner of dealing with them. Recall from Chapter 1 that Descartes 
 See 4p14: "No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is 101
true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect."
See 5p14s: "Each of us has—in part, at least, if not absolutely—the power to understand 102
himself and his affects, and consequently, the power to bring it about that he is less acted on by 
them."
 This convergence, called "affective reason," should not be confused with "cognitivism," the 103
view that emotions or affects have some cognitive content. This view's best-known opponent is 
Hume, who held that affects are brute feelings. Most scholars (including myself) read Spinoza 
as being a cognitivist. But the claim that reason can become affective and transform the 
passions is altogether different from the claim that the content of affects is cognitive. See 
Marshall (2008) for further discussion of cognitivism. 
 See 4p42d: "Hilaritas is a joy which, insofar as it is related to the body, consists in this, that 104
all parts of the body are equally affected."
 It should be pointed out that, although Spinoza says that hilaritas relates chiefly to the body, 105
he certainly does not think that it relates only to the body. It relates to the body in a way that is 
crucial to the action of the mind, because it creates the bodily conditions necessary for the 
exercise of reason.
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introduces a mechanism called "the will" as a way for the mind to interact causally with the 
body.  By imposing its dictates on the body's actions, he  says, this rational will frees a person 106
from the tyranny of her passions.  Again recall the difference from Spinoza's position. For 107
Spinoza, there is no "will" that mediates between mind and body. My "willing" something to 
happen is really just my mind's forming an idea or representation of its happening. Instead of a 
rational will imposing its dictates on an irrational body, Spinoza sees a mind forming 
representations that reflect the body's affective actions. (2p49) In other words, reason is not a 
force external to the body that counters actions. Rather, the mental being part of the physical, 
reason works with the body (in parallel to it, actually) to understand its actions. It is through 
understanding these actions–not by countering them–that reason becomes embodied 
understanding and thereby enables a person to become free.  108
I conclude that grasping the parts of Spinoza 's psychology that I have presented in this 
chapter–in particular the affective aspect of the relationship between mind and body–is crucial to 
 See Meditation 4, Part 2: "The intellect allows us only to perceive ideas, not to make 106
judgements about them... [But] exercising the will consists in affirming or denying, pursuing or 
avoiding..."
 As I shall argue in Chapter 4, I do not think that a person's bondage to her passions is the 107
fault of the passions (i.e. that it is due to their "tyranny"), and neither–I argue–does Spinoza. But 
Descartes, given his the opposition he claims to find between mind and body, necessarily thinks 
this. 
 Writes Lloyd (2003, 37-38): "Through understanding the affects, replacing the inadequate 108
ideas they initially involve with more adequate ones, we do not simply retreat from the turmoil of 
passion into a realm of thought. The affect is itself transformed from a passion—an inadequate 
idea of a transition to a greater or lesser state of activity—to an active rational emotion, 
incorporating an adequate idea. This is Spinoza’s remedy for the passions—the passage from 
passivity to activity, from bondage to freedom through understanding."
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understanding his argument about active suffering. Moreover, it is essential to understanding the 
relevant points concerning the affect he calls tristitia, which is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four: 
 Pain and Sadness: A Theoretical Analysis of the Nature and Functioning of Tristitia  
Knowing the natures of striving and feeling helps a person to know what pain is and how 
it works. Of course, everyone knows what it feels like to experience pain. But that's not what I 
mean. I mean a knowledge of pain's nature, of the way it functions in the body, of its causes and 
effects, of the ways people perceive it and conceptualize it, of its place in the field of ethics. This 
knowledge of pain is quite different from experiential knowledge of it. Spinoza teaches that only 
by gaining such a theoretical–not merely experiential–knowledge of pain, which is the affect that 
he calls tristitia, can a person free herself from it. So my purpose in this chapter is to provide the 
theoretical knowledge that she needs.  
In this chapter, I examine both the predominant contemporary theory of pain and 
Spinoza's theory of pain. Prominent in contemporary theory are debates about pain's being a 
representation that a person forms of damage her body has undergone. An important part of this 
process is called "nociception," which takes place before a person's brain realizes that she has 
experienced pain. Because of the complexity involved in experiencing pain, it is impossible to 
separate physical from psychological pain. The two are in fact identical; Spinoza would say that 
they work in parallel. Important to Spinoza's own theory are the ways in which people during the 
Early-Modern period perceived pain as well the ways in which thinkers of the period developed 
pain theory. Thinkers such as Descartes and Hobbes as well as ancient philosophers like the 
 49
Stoics and Aristotle are generally recognised to have influenced Spinoza in his work on pain, 
specifically its taxonomy. Spinoza also evaluates pain in terms of his ethical system and 
demonstrates a person's moral obligation to herself, to other people, and to other beings. 
Contemporary Theory 
Humans have for a long time tried to understand what pain is and how it works, but it is 
only within the last fifty years that a person's experience of pain has come to be understood as a 
neurological representation of either psychological or physical damage. Even more recent topics 
of study–in fields such as philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, biology, and medicine–are the 
relationship between physical and psychological pain as well as the way a person's perception of 
pain affects her experience of it.  
Pain as Representational  
Recall from Chapter 1 that representationalism is the theory that, when a person perceives 
something in the external world, she is not directly perceiving that thing but is instead perceiving 
her own ideas –representations–of that thing. This theory applies to pain  in that pain itself 109 110
does not exist in nature. There exists in nature only a "something" that happens to organisms and 
makes them less able to do things. The organisms in question experience–represent to 
 Spinoza defines "idea" as "a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a 109
thinking thing" (2def3).
 Not all scholars of pain theory think so. Visually perceiving an object, some say, is 110
fundamentally different from experiencing pain.There are not only different views about the way 
pain is perceived but also different versions within the representationalist camp. For a good 
overview of the debate, see Tye (2006) and Aydede (2013).
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themselves–this "something" as pain. Experiencing pain is in this way similar to looking at an 
object like an alarm clock: I am not perceiving whatever it is that's actually there but rather the 
thoughts and feelings I have about it.  
In the case of pain, this "whatever it is that's actually there" (i.e. the thing that pain 
represents) is what the International Association for the Study of Pain identifies as "tissue 
damage." It defines pain as an "unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with 
actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage."  The way a person 111
represents that tissue damage to herself, however, constitutes her own idea, a concept formed in 
her own mind.  112
This is not to say that a person's representation of her pain is still a representation even if 
it has no being in reality. Take the cases of phantom limb pain or referred pain. A person might 
experience pain in her left arm even if she has no left arm or has actually undergone damage to a 
different part of her body. These are cases of hallucination or illusion, not of representation. 
Although representations are by nature different from the things they represent, mental concepts 
that mislead or are inaccurate are not representations at all.  
 This definition of pain is widely accepted by the scientific community and is cited as definitive 111
by most scholars of Pain Theory. For more information about the association's taxonomy, see 
http://www.iasp-pain.org/Taxonomy 
 In this way, representationalism about pain opens up questions concerning the relationship 112
between body and mind. According to this theory, I am not perceiving the damage that my 
body's tissue has undergone but rather my mind's idea of that damage (which is called "pain"). 
Put another way, my mind has no connection with bodies (physical things, like tissue damage) 
but only with ideas (mental things, like pain). This contemporary theory about the nature of pain 
confirms Spinoza's teaching that mental and physical things do not interact but instead act in 
parallel to each other. 
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Moreover, that pain is representational in nature agrees with common sense. It is often 
said that pain is the body's warning signal, a flag which alerts a person to the fact that something 
is wrong.  A signal or flag is a thing that stands for something else, even though perceiving the 113
signal itself is quite different from perceiving the thing it stands for. So it is with pain, which is a 
subjective sensation that serves only to represent an objective something which has gone wrong 
with the body. 
Nociception Process  
Neuroscientists call the process in which a person's brain realizes (by receiving neural 
information) that she has undergone tissue damage "nociception." A different part of her brain 
then turns this realisation into the subjective experience we call "pain."  In this way, a person 114
represents tissue damage to herself as pain. If I sprain my ankle, for example, I undergo tissue 
damage, which lessens my ability to do things. What has actually happened to my body seems 
very straightforward. But my body's realisation of what has happened, and the experience 
resulting from my brain's turning its realisation of my sprained ankle into pain, is a lot more 
complicated.  
 Here is the connection between a person's experience of pain and Spinoza's theory of 113
conatus. Pain's main function of to draw a person's attention to dangers and to motivate her to 
avoid them. As we saw in Chapter 2, alerting an organism to events that threaten its survival is a 
crucial part of its striving to preserve itself. 
 For more information on the distinction between nociception and pain (as well as the 114
nociception process in general), see the National Research Council (US) Committee on 
Recognition and Alleviation of Pain http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK32658/?
report=reader
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Physiologist Craig C. Freudenrich explains in a 2013 article about the way pain works 
that there are four steps involved in the nociception process: 1) contact with a stimulus (or 
stimuli), 2) reception, 3) transmission, and 4) pain center reception. A stimulus can be either 
mechanical (a type of pressure or puncture) or chemical (a type of burn). The stimulus in the case 
of my ankle is a type of pressure that causes the ligament to tear. A nerve ending senses this 
injury, whereupon it sends a signal–via my nerves–from my foot to my central nervous system. 
Once there, the signal is processed among various neurons in the brain, producing the sensation 
called “pain." 
The nerves sending a signal when I perceive an ordinary change in light, pressure, or 
temperature are of a different type from the ones that send a signal when I experience pain. In 
such cases of ordinary change, the nerves at work are called "normal somatic receptors." When I 
experience pain, however, the nerves sending the signal are called "nociceptors." There are three 
kinds of nociceptors, the main difference among them lying in the speed at which they send the 
signal "pain" to the brain. The pain I experience when I first sprain my ankle is so sharp that it 
causes me to scream. The fastest kind of nociceptor is at work. It is followed by its slower 
compatriots, which cause my foot to ache in varying degrees over the next few months.  
These nociceptors, in the process of getting the body to realize that part of it has 
undergone damage and of then sending the signal "pain" to my brain, travel upwards through 
different segments of my spinal cord and form synapses (connections) with neurons there. (It 
should be pointed out here, given that there is often confusion about a pain's exact location, that a 
nociceptor does not confine itself to synapsing with another neuron only on the segment through 
which it is traveling. It may synapse several segments above or below its pathway. For this 
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reason, though it is fairly easy in the case of a sprained ankle to locate exactly the pain's source, 
it is in many other cases more difficult.) At this point, the nociceptors have reached my brain 
stem and alerted my body to the fact that something is wrong with it. 
I don't feel "pain" until the nociceptors reach the higher levels of my brain. Here, a 
nociceptor typically synapses with neurons in the medulla (the area of the brain that controls 
physical reactions) and the somatosensory cortex (the area that controls certain physical 
behaviours). There is no single area that is "in charge" of pain, though; depending on the nature 
of the pain, nociceptors synapse with a variety of neurons throughout my brain. When I sprain 
my ankle, it is for the most part nociceptors synapsing with neurons in my anterior insula and 
anterior cingulate cortex that causes my foot quickly to retract and involuntarily to twitch. In this 
way, a person's body realizes that part of it has undergone tissue damage and then turns this 
damage into the experience of pain. Yet there are other factors involved in producing this 
experience.  
Identity of Physical Pain and Psychological Sadness  
It should be obvious by now that pain is a complex event. It involves not only physical 
factors (e.g. the nociception process described above in the case of my sprained ankle) but also 
psychological ones. These psychological factors are called in the literature on pain theory 
"modulatory influences" on pain and include such things as fear, anxiety, and stress.  115
 See the section on Modulatory Pain by the National Research Council (US) Committee on 115
Recognition and Alleviation of Pain http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK32658/?
report=reader. See also Ploghaus (2003), who analyses functional neuroimaging studies and 
shows that psychological factors constitute a significant part of pain. 
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Besides using nociceptors to alert myself to the fact that I have undergone tissue damage, 
I react in other ways to spraining my ankle. For instance, I scream, cry, and turn red. I also feel 
sad, worried, and scared. We usually label these reactions as either "physical" or "psychological." 
(The nociception process would also be labelled "physical," but, since it is a cause necessary to a 
person's feeling pain and can't be perceived outwardly the way screaming, crying, and turning 
red can, it's not usually considered to be a "reaction" at all.) We might say that screaming, crying, 
and turning red are physical reactions, while feeling sad, worried, and scared are psychological 
reactions. But the truth is that we can't separate our reactions to pain into neat little categories, 
because each reaction is mixed up with and dependent on the other ones. This makes it 
impossible to tell which reaction falls under which category. How is screaming to be 
distinguished from feeling sad or scared? Or feeling worried from turning red? Moreover, 
humans experience many, many other emotions and feelings. How is any one of these to be 
distinguished from any other? It can't be. In the process of doing something as seemingly 
clearcut as spraining my ankle I set in motion a slew of jumbled-together feelings and 
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emotions.  Our affective reactions to experiencing pain cannot possibly be divided into 116
"physical" and “psychological." 
There is a very good reason that they can't be. Humans' experiences cannot be divided 
into physical and psychological because humans themselves cannot be divided into body and 
mind. As Spinoza pointed out more than three-hundred years ago, mind and body–the physical 
and the psychological–are identical.  And they don't interact. It isn't the case, for example, that 117
the mind feels pain and then induces the body to emote it. Rather, as Spinoza also pointed out, 
mind and body work in parallel. There is really only one unit that experiences pain: the body-
mind, if you will. This body-mind experiences pain and then expresses that pain in a variety of 
ways. Some of these ways humans find it convenient to call "physical" and others 
"psychological." But both are in reality expressions of one unit.  
This phenomenon of the body and the mind working in parallel–what Spinoza called 
"parallelism"–is evident in everyday life. It is not only the case that both my body and my mind 
(i.e. both the physical and the psychological) react to the physical pain involved in spraining my 
 One might conclude from reading this that "I" am neither mind nor body but a jumbled-116
together slew of both. Although this area is somewhat controversial, I think, coming down on the 
materialist or physicalist side of the debate, that it would be a mistake to draw this conclusion. 
This "I" that experiences pain–that experiences anything at all, really–is body only; what 
humans call "the mind" is nothing more than a conceptual illusion that helps them to understand 
the workings of the body. Neuroscience teaches that everything called "mental"–including all 
thoughts, feelings, and wishes–derives from an area in the brain. Because the brain is part of 
the body, so is the mind. McLeod (2007) provides a good overview of this debate. Stoljar (2015) 
examines various defenses of physicalism. The clearest argument against the sort of 
physicalism I defend here states that physicalism cannot fully explain the nature of felt 
experience. It is given by Jackson (1986). As a consequence of physicalism to contemporary 
pain theory, the brain is interconnected in a massive way with the rest of the body. So 
psychological pain really is physical pain whose source is not as readily apparent.
 Recall from Chapter 1 Spinoza's saying that "the order and connection of ideas is the same 117
as the order and connection of things" (2p7).
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ankle. It is also the case that they both react to the psychological pain, such as that involved in 
breaking up with my boyfriend. Some people think that pain of this sort is not "real,"  perhaps 118
because its cause and workings are not as straightforward as they are in the case of a sprained 
ankle. Yet breaking up with my boyfriend is no less painful–and sometimes it is even more 
painful–than is spraining my ankle.  
Of course, pain is characterized by ontological monism but conceptual dualism. In other 
words, pain is the same thing whether it applies to the mind or the body but is easier to 
understand and to talk about if it is separated into physical and psychological. For this reason I 
distinguished between the pain involved in spraining my ankle and the pain involved in breaking 
up with my boyfriend. In reality, however, there is no difference between the body's experience 
of pain and the mind's experience of it. Psychologist Alan Fogel (2012) writes that "our bodies 
use a single neural system to detect and feel pain, regardless of whether [that pain] is physical or 
psychological." There is to the body of an organism no difference between experiencing pain as a 
physical emotion or a psychological feeling.  
Even though pain is easier to talk about and understand if it is separated into physical and 
psychological, it is nevertheless one thing. Yet this one thing itself is, as I have pointed out, 
hardly simple and straightforward. According to McGrath (1994), "Pain is a complex, 
multidimensional perception that varies in quality, strength , duration, location, and 
 Some college professors are notorious for this. If a student breaks her arm and asks to take 118
tomorrow's exam at a later date, they will inevitably grant the request. But if a student breaks up 
with her boyfriend or girlfriend and makes the same request
, they will roll their eyes and tell her to suck it up. Of course it is easier to verify a broken arm 
than a relationship-breakup. Given that the breakup can be verified, though, is it any less 
incapacitating than a broken arm?
 57
unpleasantness." Pain's complexity is evident in the fact that the neural pathways used in the 
nociception process are quite different from those used in the process of experiencing pain. 
Moreover, the way a person experiences pain–"perceives" it, as scholars of pain theory say–is 
subject to differences in gender, ethnicity, personality, and socioeconomic level.  These 119
differences do not affect merely pain reports–the way people say that they experience pain. They 
actually affect the way a person's body undergoes pain.  
Spinoza's Theory of Pain  
There was very little understanding in the Early-Modern Period about what pain was and 
how it worked. Despite the fact that Spinoza thought and wrote during this period, however, his 
theory of pain–of tristitia– shares remarkable similarities with contemporary theories. Included 
in Spinoza's theory is an evaluation of pain's nature in terms of ethics, which deals both with 
questions concerning pain's goodness/badness and with the moral obligations it implies. . M 
The Early-Modern Perception of Pain  
Physicians, scientists, and philosophers both before and during the Early-Modern Period 
knew very little about what pain was and how it worked. For one thing, they thought that humans 
alone could experience pain and did not consider that non-human animals were also sentient.  120
It is subject to a lot of other differences as well. Jarrett (2011) takes a comprehensive look at 119
these. He writes that "people's beliefs and upbringing also affect the way their bodies respond to 
pain" (418). Other factors that influence the way people experience pain, such as attention to it 
and expectations about it, are examined by Hansen and Streltzer (2005).
 Spinoza challenged this thinking with his metaphysics and particularly with his panpsychism, 120
according to which every being is conscious to some degree. 
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This thinking was probably due to the Church's teaching that humans were the only significant 
part of nature and that only their actions were meaningful.  In addition, people were confused 
about the cause of pain. They thought that a person experienced pain through evil spirits, as 
punishment from God, or because her "vital fluids" were unbalanced. Perhaps worst of all was 
ignorance about the basic working of pain. It was thought to be a passion of the "soul" rather 
than a sensation of the body (including the mind), and its source was assumed to be the heart 
rather than the brain.  121
Things started to change in 1644 with the publication of Descartes' Principles of 
Philosophy. In it, he discussed phantom limb pain and realized that the pain in question was real 
and not imaginary. Even more significantly, he theorized that pain was a sensation felt by the 
brain rather than by the limb itself.  Assuming, however, that the mind had to interact with the 122
body in order for pain to be experienced at all, he introduced a "soul" or "animal spirits"–
functioning via the infamous pineal gland–as the means of their interaction.  
Descartes' Passions of the Soul was published in 1650 and his Treatise on Man in 1664, 
and they revolutionized studies about both the physiology and the theory of pain. The most 
important thing they did was to start people thinking about the body as a sort of machine. 
Descartes incorrectly saw pain as a way that this machine malfunctioned (and not just as a signal 
that it had done so), but he was correct in theorizing that pain was conveyed by nerve fibres 
 See Rey (1998) for an excellent history of the way pain was perceived within the cultures of 121
this period as well as the prevailing medical theories about it. 
 Scholars conjecture that, in forming both this theory and later ones concerning pain, 122
Descartes was influenced by William Harvey's 1628 discovery of systematic circulation . Its 
significance lay in the fact that it offered a rational, scientific way of understanding the way the 
body worked. 
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(neurons had not yet been discovered) to the brain. The image that he painted in this book of the 
basic way that pain functions has become famous in many academic circles. The image was of a 
hammer striking a man's hand. He imagined a hollow tube running from the man's hand and 
connected to a bell in his brain. When the hammer struck the man's hand, he wrote, the message 
"pain" would travel through the tube and ring the bell. Descartes' image demonstrated that the 
source of pain lay in the brain rather than the heart and that bodily actions were mechanical and 
predictable.  This meant that questions concerning the nature of pain and the way a person 123
experiences it were no longer to be "answered" by charlatans and religious mystics but by 
scientists.  
But it also meant that a person's feelings and emotions (traditionally attributed to the 
body) had nothing to do with her cognitive processes (traditionally attributed to the mind). As 
Damasio explains in his 2005 book Descartes' Error, a person's feelings and emotions are in fact 
essential to the functioning of her cognitive processes. She cannot reason without them. 
Moreover, the fact that they work in parallel is the key to understanding such things as 
consciousness and individuality. So, in spite of his important contributions to pain theory, 
Descartes left a negative impact on much of the academic community by separating mind from 
body.  124
 See Olson (2013) for a discussion of the way Descartes' theories about pain fit into 123
contemporary treatments of pain.
 There has been disagreement among scholars about the extent to which Descartes tried to 124
create a union between the workings of mind and body. The classic treatment of this issue is 
given by Radner (1971). Recent scholars tend to focus on applying Descartes' "real distinction" 
between mind and body to contemporary problems. Duncan (2000) argues, for example, that 
many readings of Descartes have been selective and misleading. He proposes that scholars 
should reevaluate Descartes' attempts to unify mind and body, particularly in regard to pain 
theory.
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Spinoza's Influences and Taxonomy  
Spinoza did not write about the way pain worked in the human body, as Descartes and 
other philosophers before him had. After all, the purpose of the Ethics was to show readers that 
leading an ethical life was akin to leading a rational life. Analyzing the role played by the affects 
in such a life was important, but analyzing their technical workings was not. For this reason, 
Spinoza's writings on pain were exclusively theoretical.  125
Before he begins discussing the affects, Spinoza points out that no one has ever treated 
them in the way that he is about to do.  And he's right. More to the point, Spinoza is unique–as 126
far as predecessors go–in the way he teaches people to deal with their experiences of pain. But 
other philosophers did influence him in developing this teaching. Most influential, of course, was 
Descartes, who, as we've seen, wrote prolifically about pain. Although it is likely that Spinoza 
was familiar with Descartes' writings on the physiology of pain, he did not comment on them. 
Nevertheless, he was clearly aware of Descartes' discovery that a person's brain controlled her 
experiences of pain. This awareness is reflected in the fact that he held tristitia (as well as all the 
other affects) to be in part a representation or idea formed by the mind. In this way, Spinoza's 
theory about pain is akin to the contemporary theory that we discussed earlier.  
Spinoza departed from Descartes in asserting that a person's mind and body worked in 
parallel to produce her experience of pain. A related point of departure, which has already been 
mentioned and will be discussed in more detail later, was Descartes' teaching that the mind can 
 Schmitter (2014).125
 See 3pref: "No one, to my knowledge has determined the nature and powers of the Affects, 126
nor what … the Mind can do to moderate them."
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have absolute control over the passions (which he attributed to the body), particularly over the 
painful ones.  Spinoza's teaching was quite the opposite. Because he did not separate mind 127
from body, he would not have considered it even possible that the one could have control over 
the other. The passions were for him both physical and mental, and he held that a passion could 
be controlled only by another passion.   128
In holding this, Spinoza was opposing not only Descartes but also the Stoics.  It is true 129
that both Spinoza and the Stoics treated the affects in a rational way, but they differed sharply on 
what it meant to do this.  According to the traditional interpretation, the Stoics thought that 130
treating the affects rationally meant eliminating them as far as possible.  Dealing with pain 131
amounted to a person's pushing it aside and forcing herself to act as though she were not really 
 See Article 18 of Passions of the Soul, which Spinoza quoted in Ethics. 127
 Recall 4p14: "No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it 128
is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect."
 There is some controversy among scholars about the extent to which the Stoics influenced 129
Spinoza. It is important to recognize their similarities in metaphysics, psychology, ethics, and 
politics. DeBrabander (2007) devotes an excellent book to examining these similarities. But it is 
also important to recognize the ways in which Spinoza differed from the Stoics. Douglas (2013) 
highlights these differences and suggests alternative reasons for some of the similarities. The 
decisive point for me is that, even though the Ethics features quotations from several Stoic 
thinkers, there is no evidence that Spinoza studied Stoicism in detail. A contrast, as Manzini 
(2009) points out, is the extensive study he made of Aristotelianism. Everything that I write is 
influenced by the books that I read, the movies that I watch, and the music that I listen to. 
Sometimes I quote from these sources. Maybe Spinoza did the same thing. There is no reason 
to make more than this of Spinoza's connection to the Stoics.  
 See Miller (2015, 5).130
 Actually, some scholars argue that the Stoics wanted to eliminate only the negative passions, 131
not the ones that aid a person in pursuing virtue. But most scholars think that such an argument 
goes against the very core of Stoic philosophy. Employing passions to help become more 
virtuous is a hallmark of Aristotelianism, not of Stoicism. The Stoics thought that people could 
attain virtue only through being rational and that anything attained through being passionate 
isn't virtue at all. 
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experiencing it.  Spinoza, on the other hand, thought that it meant using reason to transform 132
passive affects into active ones. As we shall see in more detail later, Spinoza taught that a person 
should deal with pain by engaging with it and thereby putting herself into a better emotional 
state.  
Pain as well as the affects deriving from it were foremost among the passions that 
Spinoza thought should be transformed. These derivatives included such affects as anger, hatred, 
fear, envy, and contempt. It doesn't seem quite right that affects such as these, especially ones 
like hatred and envy, should derive from pain. After all, we typically feel sorry for people who 
are experiencing pain but strongly disapprove of those who hate or envy others. Maybe this is 
because we consider the person experiencing pain to be the victim of her pain but consider the 
person who is being hated or envied (rather than the one doing the hating or envying) to be the 
victim of hatred or envy. But that is not accurate. Of course, the actions that a person commits as 
a result of hatred often victimize other people. But those same actions as well as the affect giving 
rise to them also victimize the person doing the hating. In fact, Spinoza thinks that, because 
everything we do is subject to necessity (including the painful affects that we experience), the 
person doing the hating is just as much a victim as is the person who is hated. This is not to say 
that such a person should be pitied, since, as we shall see, Spinoza points out that pity is just 
 A famous story is told by Diogenes Laertius about the slave/Stoic philosopher Epictetus. 132
Epictetus was working in the fields one day, when his owner, displeased at something Epictetus 
had done, began to twist his arm behind him. As the owner continued to twist his arm, Epictetus 
calmly informed him, "you are breaking my arm." When the owner's twisting did indeed break 
his arm, Epictetus reported just as calmly, "my arm is broken." As uplifting as that story may be 
(especially to someone who frequently confronts physical pain), it is obvious that a person 
cannot control the way she reacts to having her arm broken but can control only the way she 
responds. 
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another painful affect. We shall examine the relationship between pain and Spinoza's 
necessitarianism more closely in the next chapter. For now, it is enough to observe that Spinoza 
was justified in claiming that affects such as hatred and envy derive from pain. 
Another affect deriving from pain, which victimizes both subject and object, is pity. 
"Pity," writes Spinoza, "is pain together with the idea of something bad that has happened to 
someone whom we imagine like ourselves" (3def58). Pity is a derivative of pain. As we shall see, 
Spinoza thinks that, since pain is a decrease in our power of acting, we should not seek to 
experienced it. It is sometimes thought that a person has to feel sorry for other people in order to 
help them. Spinoza's thinking is, however, quite the opposite. See 4p50: "Pity in a man who lives 
in accordance with the guidance of reason is in itself bad and unprofitable." Feeling sorry for 
other people, which amounts to experiencing the same sort of pain that they're experiencing, 
decreases a person's ability to help them in a calm, rational, and effective way.  Even if it did 133
not, though, it would still not make sense that one person should experience pain just because 
another person does. Moreover, as Nietzsche–whose views on pity were clearly influenced by 
Spinoza–pointed out, pity by its nature distances people from each other and forces the person 
being pitied into a position beneath that of the person doing the pitying. As an example, it is 
impossible for two people who have been shipwrecked to pity each other, because they are both 
in the same position. 
The reason I have given a sampling instead of a precise taxonomy of the affects derived 
from pain is that this is just what Spinoza does. In fact, his haphazard treatment extends to all the 
 See Bloom (2016) for the argument that empathy, an emotion closely related to pity, is 133
opposed to what he calls "rational compassion," the correct response to others' pain. 
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affects. That it does may seem strange, given the meticulous way in which Spinoza organizes 
every other part of his philosophical system. Yet he states in the Preface to Part 3 that he aims in 
this and the following parts "to determine the powers of the affects and the power of the mind 
over the affects." To do this, "it is enough to have a general definition of each affect" (3p56s), or 
"to enumerate only the main affects" (3p59s). His reason for supplying only general definitions? 
"From what has already been said," he writes, "I believe it is clear to anyone that the various 
affects can be compounded with one another in so many ways, and that so many variations can 
arise from this composition that they cannot be defined by any number" (3p59s). According to 
Spinoza, it is neither possible nor necessary to give a precise taxonomy of the affects, including 
those that derive from pain.  
Spinoza's Ethical Evaluation of Pain  
As we have seen several times, pain is for Spinoza a decrease in a being's power of 
acting. And, since he equates a being's power with its happiness and self-fulfilment, it is also the 
case that pain causes beings to be less happy and less self-fulfilled. That it does so means , for 
Spinoza, that pain is bad. The reason it means this is that Spinoza is both an ethical and a 
psychological egoist. He is an ethical egoist in thinking that every being ought to seek only its 
own advantage, and he is a psychological egoist in thinking that every being can seek only its 
own advantage.  
Spinoza's position entails that a thing is good or bad for a being depending on whether or 
not  that thing agrees with that being's nature. Pain is bad for a person because it goes against her 
nature. It is not natural for a person to experience pain. Nevertheless, says Spinoza, all beings 
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evaluate things from their own perspectives. An acorn, for example, takes on different ethical 
qualities when looked at from different standpoints. I may judge it bad if it falls on my head; a 
squirrel may judge it good if it is edible; another animal may judge it to be indifferent.  Yet it is 134
also true that each perspective is arbitrary, because it does not define goodness and badness 
independently of individual perspectives.  
Saying that a thing ought to agree with a being's nature is the only non-arbitrary, non-
perspectival, purely rational way of defining goodness and badness.  This is the reason Spinoza 135
writes that "virtue is nothing but acting from the laws of one's own nature" (4p18s). Since every 
being strives by its nature to increase its power of acting and in doing so to be  happier and more 
self-fulfilled, goodness just is this striving. (4def8) So Spinoza writes, "By good here I 
understand every kind of joy, and whatever leads to it" (3p39s). Evaluating things in terms of 
what they are in themselves prevents external, arbitrary standards from being imposed on them. 
My actions are good if they help me to increase my power of acting (i.e. to persevere in my 
being) and bad if they do not help me. (There is no difference here between "not helping" and 
 See the preface to Part 4: "As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing 134
positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, 
or notions we form because we compare things to one another, for one snd the same thing can, 
at the same time, be good, and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for one 
who is melancholy, bad for one who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf."
 This is the prevailing interpretation. It is not absolutely clear to me, however, whether 135
Spinoza saw "agrees with my nature" as a non-perspectival way of defining goodness or as just 
a very good perspective from which to define it. I am thinking here of Nietzsche's perspectivism. 
In Section 481 of The Will to Power, Nietzsche says that the world is "interpretable" and "has 
countless meanings." This sounds a lot like Spinoza. So does Nietzsche's writing in the same 
section that, according to perspectivism, "it is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and 
their For and Against." Cf. 3p9s: "We neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything 
because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we 
strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it." We call something "good" because we strive after it. 
This may be enough for Spinoza. 
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"hurting." If an action isn't helping me persevere in my being, it is doing the opposite.) Indeed, 
anything–an acorn, a squirrel, even I myself–is good to the extent that it is powerful and bad to 
the extent that it is not. Experiencing pain makes me weak and powerless. This is just another 
way of saying that pain is bad.  
If a thing agrees with my nature and so increases my power of acting–if it is a good 
thing–then I am morally obligated to pursue it. (4p18s) Pursuing it is the right thing to do. 
Spinoza asserts that the nature of any human being is, as we have seen, to reason about things, to 
understand them, to form adequate ideas of them. Doing these things increases a person's power 
of acting, which is to say that it makes her happier and more self-fulfilled. It follows that humans 
are morally obligated to be rational. Reasoning about stuff is the right thing to do. As we saw in 
Chapter 1 and will see again in Chapter 5, the best sort of stuff about which to reason–or, rather, 
the best way to reason about stuff–falls under the category of the third kind of knowledge.  
This talk of moral obligation and rightness in the context of pursuing one's own 
advantage sounds strange. It sounds that way because people are used to thinking that they ought 
to help others and that serving others' interests is the right thing to do. And so it is. According to 
Spinoza, it is right to help others and to serve their interests. Doing these things is part of what it 
means to be rational.  Serving others' interests is in this way a natural consequence of pursuing 136
 This is a major point of both the Ethics and the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect136
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one's own interest (i.e. of being rational).  In other words, Spinoza does not teach people to be 137
altruistic in spite of the fact that he is an egoist but rather because of this fact.  138
There is another way in which serving others' interests is a consequence of pursuing one's 
own interest. Since Spinoza holds that it is in every person's interest to be rational, it follows that 
I am pursuing my own interest whenever I act rationally. But that is not all I am doing. If being 
rational is in everyone's interest, it cannot be only in my interest but must be in the interest of 
every other person as well. So, whenever my being rational results in others' being rational, I am 
in fact pursuing both our interests at the same time. Spinoza says that this happens all the time. 
"There is no singular thing in nature which is more useful to man," he writes, "than a man who 
lives according to the guidance of reason" (4p35c1). I make other people rational simply by 
being rational myself. And, because making other people rational is in effect the same thing as 
being rational myself, it can be said that I am morally obligated to make other people rational. 
My moral obligation extends beyond other humans. Spinoza writes in the same Corollary 
that "what is most useful to man is what agrees most with his nature..." The category "those who 
share my nature" includes the category "those who are rational," so "those who share my nature" 
 It is clear that Spinoza's brand of egoism is different from the ethical doctrines of similar 137
thinkers, notably Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes thought that a person should help others so that they 
would in turn help her. Spinoza's teaching was, unsurprisingly, based on doing what is natural. 
This meant a person's pursuing her own interest by acting rationally–and serving others' 
interests as a consequence. The distinction is subtle but important. 
 It is irritating to me that some Spinoza scholars, such as Stephen Nadler, fail to recognize 138
this causal relationship between Spinoza's egoism and his altruism. Although his article is 
excellent in many ways, Nadler (2013) writes that Spinoza, "despite the fundamental egoism, 
engages in behavior toward others that is typically regarded as "ethical", even altruistic." Why 
discuss the consequences of Spinoza's egoism only to attack their source?!
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includes the other members of my species, Homo sapiens.  So I ought to act rationally towards 139
these members. But "those who share my nature" does not include only other humans. This is 
because, in addition to being rational, I am also a living being. As such, I share a nature not only 
with all humans but also with all other animals, all vegetables, and all minerals. This is a major 
point of Spinoza's metaphysics: humans are modes just like all the others and do not constitute a 
"kingdom within a kingdom." It is also a crucial part of his conatus doctrine and of his 
panpsychism.  Because it is in my interest–I am morally obligated–to act rationally towards 140
those who share my nature, and because I share my nature with all living beings, it follows that I 
am morally obligated to act rationally towards all living beings. According to Spinoza, doing this 
is part of what it means to live "according to the guidance of reason."  
A person's moral obligation to herself, to other people, and to other living beings relates 
to the way she ought to deal with pain. As we have seen, Spinoza holds that, because pain is a 
decrease in a being's power of acting (and so is something that makes it less happy and less self-
fulfilled), it follows that pain is bad. So beings shouldn't seek to experience pain. This directive 
is really pointed at human beings, since they are the only beings that are known to act against 
 It is quite, quite clear that not all humans reason about things as accurately as other humans 139
do. More than a few people leap to my mind. In a biological sense, though, one human is as 
rational as the next. The biological sense is used when Spinoza refers to other people as "those 
who share my nature."
 This interpretation is similar to that of Arne Naess (1977), who associates humans' moral 140
obligation to other living beings with their level of activity "in the world." Against Naess's 
interpretation, Genevieve Lloyd (1980) claims that Spinoza was a "speciesist" who confined his 
discussion of ethics to ethical action by humans and towards humans. She argues that Spinoza 
did not intend his system of morality to apply to any living beings other than humans. In his 
response to Lloyd's article, Naess (1980) admits that Spinoza's ethical system is centered 
around humans but points out that the very structure of his philosophy is built on the unity of 
living beings. For more recent arguments regarding both the validity and soundness of 
Spinoza's take on animal ethics, see Wilson (1999) and Grey (2013).
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their natures. So humans shouldn't seek to experience pain. Nor should they seek for other people 
or any other beings to experience pain. This obviously means that they oughtn't inflict pain on 
other beings. But it also means that they should help other beings when those beings do 
experience pain and that they should prevent other beings from experiencing pain whenever it is 
possible to do so. They should do these things because doing them is part of what it means to act 
rationally and because acting rationally is in their interests. But what about the pain that cannot 
be avoided, helped, or prevented? Each person has to deal with her own experience of such pain. 
Spinoza offers a rational way to do this, which we shall examine closely in Chapter 5. For now, it 
is enough to point out that dealing with pain is different when a person must undergo it–when it 
cannot be avoided and when no one else can enable her not to experience it. 
    
I conclude that grasping the aspects of pain theory that I have discussed in this chapter–
both the predominant contemporary theory and Spinoza's treatment of the affect called tristitia–
are crucial to understanding his argument about active suffering. Moreover, they are essential to 
understanding the relevant points concerning Spinoza's necessitarianism and its relationship to 
human freedom, which are the subjects of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five: 
Necessity and Freedom: An Examination of the Relationship in Spinoza's Philosophy 
Between Necessitarianism and Human Freedom  
Knowing what it means to experience pain and sadness enables a person to grasp both the 
nature of necessity and the fact that there are necessary connections among all things, which are 
the concepts underlying Spinoza's theory of freedom. It is often thought that necessity is the 
opposite of freedom, but this is far from being the case. The purpose of this chapter is to show 
not just that it is possible to be free even though everything happens necessarily but also that it is 
possible to be free for the very reason that everything happens necessarily. Understanding this 
relationship between necessity and freedom is crucial to the way Spinoza thinks that a person 
should deal with her experience of pain. 
In this chapter, I examine both Spinoza's doctrine of necessitarianism and his related 
doctrine of human freedom (as well as relevant contemporary positions on these topics). I look 
first at what necessitarianism is and at the ways  in which it is both different from and similar to 
determinism. Spinoza is perhaps the most famous proponent of necessitarianism, and, although 
there are scholars who disagree with this assessment, most scholars not only agree with it but 
even regard it as a crucial to understanding the rest of his philosophy. Recognizing the distinction 
between necessity and compulsion is important to getting a thorough grasp of necessitarianism, 
as Spinoza points out. I look next at the history of the debate over the compatibility of free will 
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with determinism, which is called "the compatibility problem," and especially at the formation of 
compatiblism and incompatiblism by Hume and Kant. Relevant to this discussion is the 
relationship between the compatibility problem and moral responsibility as well as the problems 
inherent in both. By rejecting free will and embracing necessitarianism, Spinoza develops a 
theory of human freedom that both resolves these problems and begins to show how a person 
should deal with her experience of pain.  
Necessitarianism  
Necessitarianism is a principle in metaphysics that denies all mere possibility: its 
proponents never say merely that an event can happen the way it happens but instead always say 
that it must happen the way it happens. As a result, the world could not be different than it is (not 
even in the smallest way). It is important in looking at necessitarianism to recognize the ways it 
is both similar to and different from determinism. Though determinism is perhaps the better-
known principle, necessitarianism has its own following among philosophers even today. Its 
most famous philosophical proponent, however, is Spinoza, who pointed out the relationship 
between necessitarianism and other key concepts in his philosophy.  
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Determinism and Necessitarianism  
The metaphysical theories of determinism and necessitarianism are closely linked. 
Determinists hold that every event , from a pine tree's existing to my deciding to become a 141
vegetarian, is determined by antecedent events to happen exactly the way it happens. For 
example, each of my actions is determined by my previous actions (each of which is determined 
by the action previous to it, from my action to my mother's action to my grandmother's action, 
etc.). What I'm doing now, in thirty seconds, in ten years, and for the rest of my life is mapped 
out in what Spinoza calls "an infinite chain of causes" (1p28). In this way, my actions follow a 
set path.  
Determinism depends on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which is the idea that 
there must always be a reason for or a cause of everything that exists. This means that even the 
most ordinary fact–like a pine tree's existing–demands an explanation. Brute (i.e. unexplainable) 
facts are not really facts at all. The connection between determinism and the PSR is clear. As we 
shall see in a moment, the PSR's connection to necessitarianism is even clearer.  At the root of 142
determinism is the idea that every fact can be explained, that every event has a reason for 
happening in exactly the way it happens.  
 I say "every event" rather than "everything" because this is the accepted way among 141
scholars to speak about determinism. See Hoefer (2016). Maybe the reason for its being the 
accepted way is that there really are no static things, only actions. So it is more accurate to 
speak of events like existing and deciding than of static things like a pine tree or my 
vegetarianism. 
 That the PSR implies necessitarianism makes it unattractive to some scholars. Yet a 142
successful argument has never been made against it. For a discussion of this issue as well as a 
defense of metaphysical rationalism in general, see Dasgupta (2014).
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Necessitarians take the determinist position to its logical conclusion. They say that, 
because it is impossible for any event to happen in any way other than the way it is determined to 
happen, the world  (including both its past and future) could not be different from the way it is. 143
It is that way necessarily. In other words, the set path of my actions cannot be any other way than 
the way  it is, because every one of my actions depends on every other action. Hence the path 
itself depends on each individual action.  In short, because the path that my actions follow is 
determined by every one of those very actions, the path could never have been and can never be 
different. It is the way it is of necessity.  
One way to think of the relationship between determinism and necessitarianism is to 
consider that all existing things arise from an interconnected web of cause and effect. They are 
interdependent. In other words, every event is both a cause and an effect of another event.  
An example is the pencil that is lying in front of me. It is the effect of many causes (of all 
causes, actually). It is made of wood, lead, paint, metal, and rubber. Some person grew the tree 
from which the wood came; she relied on the proper soil and weather conditions in order to do 
so. Someone else, using tools produced by other materials and other people, cut the tree down. 
After a third person formed the tree into lumber, a fourth transported the lumber to a factory, 
where a fifth used the lumber—in addition to the other materials, each of which was 
manufactured in a similar way—to produce the pencil that is lying in front of me. And don't 
 It makes no difference that what humans call "the world" is constituted to some degree of the 143
way they perceive it. As Wittgenstein said, "tell me how you are looking and I'll tell you what 
you'll find." The world is governed by necessity, even though that necessity is, like the world, 
constituted to some degree of the way humans perceive it. Moreover, humans' act of perceiving 
the world is part of the causal chain. They will always perceive it to be exactly the way they 
perceive it to be. 
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forget: each person and each material involved in the pencil's story has its own story (that 
involves other persons and other materials with its own story…) 
There are far too many causes of this one little happening—that there is a pencil lying in 
front of me—for me to enumerate. Besides the many material and efficient causes that I have 
named are many formal causes. Why, for instance, is the pencil lying in front of me instead of 
behind me? Why is it not stuck instead into the wall of an apartment belonging to a fellow named 
Takao who lives in Japan? Why is the object lying in front of me a pencil and not a glass of 
whiskey or a copy of Emily Brontë's Wuthering Heights?  
Any event—such as the pencil's lying in front of me—happens as it does and not in 
another way because it is the effect of one cause and not of another. Every cause is also an effect; 
it is the effect of a different cause. The tree is one cause of the effect that there is a pencil lying in 
front of me. The tree is also an effect of the soil, the weather, some person’s intention to grow a 
tree, the reasons for her having that intention, the reasons for those reasons, etc. That the pencil 
lies in front of me is a cause as well as an effect. It is one cause, for instance, of my writing about 
it in this paper. It is the cause of a great many events that I either don’t know about or don’t wish 
to try enumerating. As Douglas Adams’s holistic detective, Dirk Gently, might say: that the 
pencil is lying in front of me is in some way the cause of a miniature poodle named Harriet, who 
resides in Sussex, having to sneeze at 4:14 on the morning of February 26, 2009. Everything that 
happens is both the cause and the effect of another thing’s happening. That it is demonstrates the 
way determinism leads logically to necessitarianism.  
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Spinoza's Necessitarianism  
It is quite clear that Spinoza is a necessitarian. In fact, he says that his views on the 
necessity of things are the "principle basis" of the Ethics. (1p75) Without necessitarianism, it 
does seem as though crucial parts of his system would not make sense.  
Most scholars agree with this assessment.  Garrett (1991), for example, argues that all 144
finite modes (which is Spinoza's term for what I have called "things" or "events") exist 
necessarily because they derive from Substance. Recall from Chapter 1 that Substance causes 
itself to exist (i.e. is self-caused) and thus exists necessarily by definition.  Garrett argues more 145
specifically that each finite mode should be looked at in terms of the whole collection of finite 
modes and that this collection is governed by the infinite modes, which derive immediately from 
Substance.  Since the whole collection, being indirectly derived from Substance, exists 146
necessarily, so does each finite mode. Garrett demonstrates in this way that Spinoza is a 
necessitarian. A similar point is that the identity of modes and Substance logically implies that 
everything is interdependent, i.e. that each thing determines and is determined by each other 
thing. As Spinoza puts it, "in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been 
determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain 
 Such scholars include Curley, Bennett, Della Rocca, Garrett, and Lin. It is the standard 144
interpretation that Spinoza was a strict necessitarian. It should be noted that Curley has in 
recent years interpreted Spinoza's position as being one of modified necessitarianism. See 
Curley and Walsaki (1999). It seems to me that their interpretation leaves out Spinoza's 
insistence that there exists only one possible world.
  See 1p11: "God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses 145 145
eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists."
 Recall from Chapter 1 that finite modes are what we usually call "things" and infinite modes 146
are the overarching laws of nature.
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way”(1p29). And "things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other 
order, than they have been produced” (1p33). 
Spinoza's commitment to the PSR also lends strong support to the case for his 
necessitarianism. This commitment can be seen in his saying that everything is conceivable (i.e. 
explainable) : "What cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through 147
itself" (1a2). He later states the principle explicitly: "For each thing there must be assigned a 
cause, or reason, both for its existence and for its nonexistence" (1p11d2).  This implies that 148
there is a reason for every event's happening exactly the way it happens. It is the reason Melamed 
and Lin (2016) call the PSR "the primary motivation behind Spinoza's strict necessitarianism.” 
As I have said, most scholars agree that Spinoza endorsed full-blown necessitarianism, 
and that is the standard interpretation of his position. Despite so much evidence to the contrary, 
however, there are some scholars  say that Spinoza makes a case for determinism but not for 149
necessitarianism. (Non-necessitarianism Newlands argues, for example, that, even if Spinoza 
sees finite things as existing necessarily, they can exist that way (as we saw Garrett pointing out) 
only in relation to the whole collection of finite things. But he goes on to claim that it is 
impossible for humans to conceive of finite things in such an all-encompassing way. More 
specifically, he points out that forming such a conception requires, for Spinoza, having adequate 
ideas about the finite things in question, and he thinks–in spite of very good arguments to the 
 See Della Rocca (2008) for an excellent discussion of the way that a thing's ability to be 147
conceived implies its ability to be explained.
 He says similarly in 1p8s2 that "if a certain number of individuals exists, there must be a 148
cause why those individuals, and why neither more nor fewer, exist."
 Such scholars include Christopher Martin and Samuel Newlands. 149
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contrary (which we looked at in Chapter 1–that it is impossible for humans to have adequate 
ideas. So he writes that "while necessitarianism is true from God's complete perspective, and 
while we can understand the metaphysical principles which guarantee the truth of 
necessitarianism in virtue of the existence of such comprehensive ways of conceiving the world, 
the ways of conceiving finite objects we tend to adopt will rarely, if ever, be sufficiently 
complete so as to entail true predications of necessitarianism.” 
This argument is problematic for more than one reason. First, Newlands makes a mistake 
in his treatment of adequacy. As we saw in Chapter 2, Spinoza plainly says in several places that 
it is possible for humans to attain adequate knowledge of both infinite and finite modes.  Key 150
parts of his philosophy hinge on their having this ability. Second, Newlands's general argument 
that humans do not have the capacity to grasp the necessity underlying everything presents a 
problem that is separate from his specific conclusion about adequate ideas. Spinoza writes: 
"Insofar as the mind understands all things as necessary, it has a greater power over the affects, 
or is less acted on by them" (5p6). Teaching people to have such power over the affects is a 
central theme of the Ethics, but Spinoza explicitly states here that humans cannot attain this 
power unless they grasp the necessity of everything. So the debate over Spinoza's 
necessitarianism concerns not only issues of theoretical importance but also those of practical 
importance. Fortunately, the majority of Spinoza scholars agree that the non-necessitarian 
interpreters don't have a case.  
 See 2p38c: There are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men...which must be 150
perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all."
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Necessity vs. Compulsion 
When discussing necessitarianism, it is important to distinguish between necessity and 
compulsion. In legal terminology, necessity is a plea to excuse the breaking of one law because 
doing so is necessary to preserve another law. Let's imagine that a drunk person chooses to drive 
her car. It is against the law for her to do so. She won't be convicted of a crime, however, if she 
drove while drunk in order to stop a bank robbery. Her lawyer would argue that, in these 
circumstances, it was necessary for that person to break the law against drunk driving in order to 
preserve the law forbidding theft. The person would plead compulsion, on the other hand, if 
someone had held a gun to her head and thereby forced her to drive while drunk.  The legal 151
difference between necessity and compulsion lies in choice. A drunk driver pleads necessity 
when she chooses (for a good reason) to break the law. She pleads compulsion when someone 
else forces her (i.e. chooses for her) to break the law. 
The philosophical difference between necessity and compulsion also lies in choice. In 
philosophy, necessity does not refer to an illegal action that a person undertakes for the purpose 
of preserving a law but rather to the chain of events formed by each event's determining and 
being determined by each other event. When our drunk driver stopped the bank robbery, for 
example, she did so because every other event necessarily caused that event to occur. Yet no 
other person or thing forced it to occur.  It seemed to her that she could just as well not have 152
stopped the robbery. In philosophical as well as legal terms, this person was under no 
 See Christie (1999) for an in-depth exploration of the legal concept or necessity.  151
 This definition of compulsion as the external forcing of a person's actions plays an important 152
role, as we shall see, in the compatiblist conception of freedom. This is the reason Spinoza says 
that freedom opposes not necessity but compulsion. 
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compulsion to drive while drunk. A philosopher would point out that people perform necessary 
actions by choice (as it seems to them) but compulsory actions by force.  
In fact, a philosopher did point out this distinction. Spinoza writes that a thing is 
"compelled" if it is "determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a certain and 
determinate manner" (1def7). And he says that a thing is "necessary" in the same way that "the 
three angles of a triangle are necessarily equal to two right angles." That is, they could not ever 
be any other way, even though nothing and nobody compels them to be equal.  He explains this 153
distinction further in Letter 56.  Here he opposes freedom (which we'll look at closely in the next 
section) not to necessity but to compulsion: "A man's will to live, to love, etc., is not the result of 
compulsion, yet it is necessary." 
Human Freedom   
It is often thought that the terms "freedom" and "free will" are interchangeable or at least 
that, to be free, a person must be able to choose her actions from among alternative possibilities. 
Such thinking is the basis for much of the writing, both historical and contemporary, on the topic 
of human freedom. Most writers on this topic are either compatiblists or in compatiblists. 
Although they are opposed in regards to the issue of free will's compatibility with determinism, 
they are alike in judging the concept of free will to underlie that of freedom. That Spinoza did 
not judge this to be the case–that he posited human freedom to be entirely separate from free 
 A similar point is that they could not ever be unequal because it is in their nature to be equal. 153
They fit together and are part of each other. He says the same thing in Letter 56 about heat 
being a necessary effect of fire. The same is true of all modes of Substance. It is in their nature 
to fit together and be part of each other. That is what makes them necessary.
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will–sets his theory of freedom apart from those of most other philosophers. By embracing 
necessity, it also offers a new and better way to deal one's experience of pain.  
The History of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism 
The current literature on free will deals largely with the debate about whether or not free 
will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism.  On the two sides of this 154
debate, which is often referred to as "the compatibility problem," are the incompatiblists (who 
hold that there cannot be free will if determinism is true) and the compatiblists (who hold that 
there is no such conflict). This debate has a long philosophical history. 
Although the ancient philosophers developed theories about both determinism and moral 
responsibility, they had no concept of "will" as a faculty separate from other faculties and 
capable of making free choices. The notion of "free will" was not introduced until the Middle 
Ages, when Augustine wrote On the Free Choice of the Will. Motivated by a desire to justify the 
Christian idea of "sin" and humans' moral responsibility in general, Augustine refers here to a 
separate faculty that humans have "to do otherwise" or to have alternative possibilities for the 
choices that they make. He famously calls this supposed faculty to make free choices liberum 
arbitrium. Both the concept of "will" and its capacity to make free choices came under fire in the 
 See O'Connor (2014) for a discussion of the history of free will and of its relationship to 154
contemporary positions on the compatibility problem..
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17th century as the determinism of an emerging mechanical philosophy became prominent.  It 155
was during the 18th century, however, that the contemporary arguments surrounding the 
compatibility problem were shaped.  
Hume influenced the arguments for compatiblism by analyzing "Liberty and Necessity" 
in Part 3 Sec. 1-2 of his Treatise on Human Nature and in Sec. 7 of his Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding. He argues in these sections that, although necessity governs all actions, 
both free will and moral obligation are possible. In fact, he thinks that necessity is the condition 
for the possibility of liberty. He makes this argument by distinguishing between two kinds of 
liberty. The first kind he calls the "liberty of indifference." Being identical with the free will of 
Augustine's liberum arbitrium, it is opposed to a scientific knowledge of necessity. Moreover, 
because it allows for uncaused causes, it denies an agent moral responsibility for her actions. For 
both reasons, Hume leads contemporary compatiblists in standing against the liberty of 
indifference. 
The second of liberty he calls the "liberty of spontaneity." It is consistent with a scientific 
knowledge of necessity and is opposed only to compulsion. But it is consistent with necessity 
only to the extent that it views an agent's actions as determined; only she herself is the cause of 
her motives for carrying out those actions. In this way, a person can be held morally responsible 
for the decisions that she makes, even though the actions to which those decisions lead are 
 Most philosophers of this period developed a theory about the relationship between free will 155
and determinism. Descartes, for example, taught that the physical world was wholly determined; 
it is due only to his archaic mind-body dualism that he retained the liberum arbitrium and 
identified the mental world with the capacity for making free choices. Hobbes was a full-blown 
determinist and held that there was no free will, only freedom from external compulsion. Leibniz, 
much like Spinoza, taught that everything was governed by necessity and that free will was a 
useful illusion. We'll closely examine Spinoza's theory in a moment. 
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determined. For these reasons, both Hume and contemporary compatiblists are attracted to the 
liberty of spontaneity.  
Other philosophers, however, decry Hume's soft version of free will and see the 
compatibility of free will and determinism in quite a different light. Among these philosophers is 
Kant, who called compatiblism a "wretched subterfuge" and shaped the position of contemporary 
incompatiblists in his Critique of Practical Reason and later in his Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason. In the 2nd Critique, Kant distinguishes between the determinism 
that appears in the phenomenal realm and the free will (Augustine's liberum arbitrium, which 
allows for alternative choices) of the noumenal realm that underlies this apparent determinism. 
He argues that an agent can be morally responsible for her actions only if those actions are truly 
free and are not subject to the determinism of the phenomenal realm. The problem is that few 
people ever realize the freedom that underlies determinism. Most remain stuck in the 
phenomenal realm. And it's not useful to say that, because most people do not realize that they 
are free, they are not morally responsible for their actions.  
So Kant makes a further distinction in the Religion between free will (Wille) and freedom 
of the power of choice (freie Willkür), which is something like a more powerful form of free 
will. It, like free will, is akin to liberum arbitrium in holding that an agent is morally responsible 
for her actions only if she can choose freely among alternative possibilities.  Yet the 156
determinism of the phenomenal realm does not exempt her from moral responsibility. Freedom 
of the power of choice trumps determinism and makes an agent morally responsible for her 
 Wolf (1990) makes an even stronger argument, though it is one with which Kant would 156
probably agree. She argues that, even if a person chooses to do something that is good, she 
did not act freely unless she had the capacity to do something bad.
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actions in spite of the fact that that they are determined. This seems like an argument for 
compatiblism, but it's not. Kant is saying that people's freedom to choose is the essential thing 
and that this freedom goes beyond (and so is not compatible with) determinism.   
Hume and Kant shaped opposing arguments concerning the compatibility of free will and 
determinism, but there is really no difference in the way each defines moral responsibility. For 
both philosophers, an agent is morally responsible for her actions as long as those actions 
proceed from her own will or motives. In other words, neither views determinism as 
thoroughgoing. Hume says that everything is determined, but he  does not include a person's 
motives in "everything." Kant says that most things are determined but that an agent's freedom to 
make alternative choices transcends determinism. Kant is just more honest, because he doesn't 
redefine "free will" and "determinism" in order to make his theory work out. He simply states 
that the two concepts are incompatible.  
The Compatibility Problem and Moral Responsibility  
Central to the contemporary debate over the compatibility of free will and determinism–
the compatibility problem–is the issue of an agent's moral responsibility for her actions. Scholars 
on both sides of this debate agree that the criterion for moral responsibility is free will, which can 
be loosely defined as an agent's having enough control over her motives to choose among 
alternative ways of acting.  
There are various perspectives on this debate within both the compatiblist and the 
incompatiblist camps. Although contemporary compatiblists follow Hume's position pretty 
closely, there are many disagreements among these scholars about how to define such terms as 
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"free choice" and "alternative possibilities."  Among the incompatiblists, there are those who 157
think that determinism is definitely true and those who think that, whether it is true or not, it is 
incompatible with free will.  There are also those, the libertarians, who think that determinism 158
is false. In spite of these differences, however, contemporary incompatiblists tend to follow 
Kant's position pretty closely.  
The problem with both compatiblists and incompatiblists is that they see a person's moral 
responsibility as depending on her possession of free will. But developments in neuroscience, 
biology, and psychology are increasingly showing that everything is utterly determined and that 
free will does not exist. So moral responsibility, at least in the sense that a person's actions can be 
attributed to her capacity to make alternative choices, cannot exist either. 
Moreover, it may be a good thing that moral responsibility cannot exist. To say that I am 
morally responsible for my actions is, given the present model of moral responsibility, to say that 
I ought to be either praised or blamed for having carried them out. It is to say not merely that my 
 Frankfurt (1969) argues, for example, that a person can be morally responsible for an action 157
that she takes without having chosen from alternative possibilities to take it (i.e. without having 
performed it through free will). He uses a famous example involving two persons named Black 
and Jones. Black is going to compel Jones to do something, but only if Jones would not 
otherwise choose to do it. It turns out that Jones does choose to do it. So Black doesn't have to 
compel him. Frankfurt's point is that Jones–or any other person–can be morally responsible for 
what he does even though he is not choosing from among alternative possibilities. The problem 
with his example is that it pits moral responsibility against a straw man, in this case Black's 
external compulsion. Frankfurt does not actually eliminate free will or the capacity to choose 
among alternative possibilities. Much like Hume, he just redefines it in a way that suits his 
argument. 
 See, for example, van Inwagen (1983), who argues that a person cannot act freely unless 158
there are various possible ways for her to act in the future. This is called the Consequence 
Argument. Also see Kane (1998) more strictly that she cannot will freely unless she is the one 
who originates her action. This is called the Origination Argument. It's not clear, though, that 
these are distinct arguments. Being able to choose among different ways of acting requires that 
the agent wills or originates her actions. 
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actions are either good or bad (an objective fact) but, even more, that I am either right or wrong 
in having performed them (a subjective judgment). In other words, the term "moral 
responsibility" is currently used to make a claim about an agent's moral character.  
For both these reasons, the present model of moral responsibility is no good. It cannot 
work, and it should not work. An alternative model, one that does not rely on an agent's having 
free will and that makes claims about an agent's actions instead of her character, must be found. 
Spinoza's position on the compatibility problem offers just such a model.  
Spinoza on Free Will vs. Freedom  
We have already seen that Spinoza is a hard determinist, a necessitarian, in fact. So it is 
no surprise that he strongly critiques the concept of free will.  "There is in the mind," he writes, 159
"no absolute, i.e. no free will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause, which is 
again determined by another [...] and so on to infinity” (2p48).  Whenever a person chooses to 160
do one thing instead of another, she is not exercising free will but is making the choice that the 
series of her previous decisions determined her to make. The problem is that no person can see 
the path of her actions as a whole; she can see only each individual action as she takes it. As 
 Recall from Chapter 1 that Spinoza, in opposition to Descartes, denies that the existence of 159
"will" as a separate faculty for making decisions. This so-called "will," he says, is the same thing 
as intellect or reason. Recall also that mind or intellect (or will) is itself an idea. This means that 
it is not a repository for a person's ideas but is itself the action involved in forming an idea. An 
idea, again, amounts to an affirmation or negation of something. My mind or intellect or will just 
is my affirming or negating of that something. It is for this reason impossible that there should be 
a "will" from which ideas issue out as actions. Moreover, according to Spinoza's doctrine of 
parallelism, the mind does not cause the body's actions but rather acts in parallel to the body. 
So, apart from his direct arguments against the concept of free will, it is interesting that he does 
not think that "will" can exist in the first place. 
 Pereboom (2005) alludes to this passage in his critique of libertarian free will. 160
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Spinoza explains, "they are conscious of their own actions, and ignorant of the causes by which 
they are determined." (3p2s)  But even if people realize this fact and know better than to think 161
that they have the capacity to choose their actions from among alternative possibilities, it 
nonetheless seems to them as though they are making just such a choice. The notion that agents 
act from free will is in this way an illusion.  The key is to avoid falling for this illusion. "Those 162
people who believe that they do anything by a free decree of the mind," says Spinoza, "dream 
with their eyes open" (3p2s). 
 Spinoza expands on his critique of free will in a letter that he writes in 1674 to G.H. Schuller, 161
in which he asks Schuller to imagine that a falling stone is conscious. "Conceive, if you please, 
that while continuing in motion the stone thinks, and knows that it is striving (conatus) as far as it 
can, to continue in motion. Now this stone, since it is striving as far as it can and is not at all 
indifferent, will surely think it is completely free, and that it continues in motion for no other 
reason than that is so wishes. This then, is that human freedom which all men boast of 
possessing, and which consists solely in this, that men are conscious of their desires and 
unaware of the causes by which they are determined. In the same way a baby thinks that it 
freely desires milk, an angry child revenge, and a coward flight. Again, a drunken man believes 
that it is from his free decision that he says what he later, when sober, would wish to be left 
unsaid. So, too, the delirious, the loquacious, and many others of this kind believe that they act 
from their own free decision and not that they are carried away by impulse." (Letter 58)
 An example is the way humans perceive the sun. We perceive it  as near to us, even though 162
we know that it is really far away. See 2p35s: "When we look at the sun, we imagine it as about 
two hundred feet away from us, an error which does not consist simply in this imagining, but in 
the fact that we imagine it in this way, we are ignorant of its true distance and the cause of this 
imagining. For even if we later come to know that it is more than six hundred diameters of the 
earth away from us, we nevertheless imagine it as near. For we imagine the sun so near not 
because we do not know its true distance, but because an affection of our body involves the 
essence of the sun insofar as our body is affected by the sun."
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Even though Spinoza is a hard determinist and an outspoken critic of free will, however, 
he nevertheless has a theory of freedom.  Not only does he point out the logic underlying 163
necessitarianism; he also devotes many of his writings to discussing freedom–whether 
psychological, moral, political, religious, or environmental. His version of freedom amounts to 
the concept of activity: a thing is free to the extent that it acts from its nature.  More precisely, 164
he describes it as "free" if it "exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to 
act by itself alone" (1def7).  He offers in Letter 58 the example of God or Substance: "God, 165
although he necessarily exists, yet exists freely, because he exists from the necessity of his own 
nature alone." For humans, as we saw in Chapter 2, to act from one's nature means to act 
rationally.  And acting rationally means, as we saw in Chapter 1, forming adequate ideas about 166
necessary events in the world (both the internal and the external world).  Since, given 167
 Kluz (2012) argues that, in a way, this makes Spinoza both a compatiblist and an 163
incompatiblist. But I don't think that it is useful to look at him in this way. Spinoza never shows 
an interest in either reconciling free will with determinism or in arguing that the two concepts are 
irreconcilable. This is partly because the great debate between Hume and Kant had not taken 
place. But I think that it is mostly because his theory of freedom naturally precludes the concept 
of free will and naturally requires the concept of determinism. An explicit argument concerning 
compatiblism and incompatiblism is not needed. 
 Recall from Chapter 2 that the concept of activity is defined by the extent of a person's ability 164
to act rather than to be acted upon. It is bound up with the concepts of "power of acting" and 
"conatus," which is synonymous with a being's "nature." The more active a person is, the 
greater is her capacity to act from her nature or to strive to preserve herself. 
 Notice that the language of necessity and determinism finds a place in the very definition of 165
freedom. 
 In terms of affective reason and acting as a whole person, it means acting intuitively. (Recall 166
the discussion in Chapter 1 of the three kinds of knowledge.) We'll look more closely at this 
application of intuitive knowledge in Chapter 5. 
 Recall that, for Spinoza, all knowledge proceeds from sense experience. Adequate ideas are 167
no different. But the sense experience from which they come must be tempered by reason. 
Contrast this to inadequate ideas, which proceed from sense experience alone.
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necessitarianism, all events are necessary, acting rationally means forming adequate ideas about 
everything. This is Spinoza's theory of human freedom. Humans are free, he says, to the extent 
that they reason about the necessary connections undergirding the worlds both inside and outside 
them. So it is not just the case that there is no conflict with determinism and that freedom is 
possible in spite of the fact that humans lack free will. It is possible for humans to be free, writes 
Spinoza, precisely because they lack free will and are determined in their actions.  168
Spinoza bases important parts of his philosophy–like his teaching about the way a person 
should deal with her experience of pain–on this theory. We shall look closely at this teaching in 
the next chapter. Suffice it to say for now that a person can be free by employing what Spinoza 
calls "internal determination."  The difference between internal and external determination lies 169
in the extent of one's understanding. If a  person's actions are externally determined, they result 
"from fortuitous encounters with things" and end up producing a "confused and mutilated" 
knowledge. If a person's actions are internally determined, however, they result from "the fact 
that [this person] considers a number of things at once, to understand their agreements, 
differences, and oppositions" and end up producing a "clear and distinct" knowledge. In other 
words, my actions are externally determined when I happen to learn a little something about 
them by accident. They are internally determined when I determine myself to know completely 
 Spinoza argues against free will in 2p49 and then writes in the Scholium, "it remains now to 168
indicate how much knowledge of this doctrine [against free will] is to our advantage in life."
See 2p29s: I say expressly that the Mind does not have adequate knowledge, but only a 169
confused and mutilated knowledge, of itself, it's own Body, and external bodies so long as it 
perceives things from the common order of nature, that is, so long as it is determined 
externally–namely, from fortuitous encounters with things–to consider this or that; and not so 
long as it is determined internally, from the fact that it considers a number of things at once, to 
understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as it is disposed 
internally, in this or another way, then it regards things clearly and distinctly.
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what things are, why they exist, and how they are all connected. It should be noted that, if a 
person acts through external determination, she is passive: she acts only because some 
knowledge about things happens upon her. If she acts through internal determination, on the 
other hand, she is active: she acts because she herself has made the effort to understand things 
thoroughly.  
Of course, whether a person does or does not determine her actions internally–hence 
whether she is free or unfree–is itself necessitated. But, since the resulting freedom is distinct 
from the concept of free will, this fact does not cancel out the importance of internal 
determination or render it impossible for a person to be really and truly free.  In fact, it is 170
important in establishing a new and better model of moral responsibility. For example, we can 
use this theory to condemn the action of stealing–and even to demand that the thief repay what 
she has stolen–without branding her as a horrible person. Because Spinoza's version of freedom 
is based on a thing's nature and activity instead of a supposed ability to choose among 
alternatives, it justifies the praising or blaming of an agent's actions rather than of her moral 
character.  
 Spinoza's model of someone who is really and truly free is his "free man." By "really and truly 170
free," though, I do not mean to suggest–as I've said many times before–that Spinoza paints a 
picture of the free man as someone who both can and should get rid of all influence on him by 
the passions. The traditional interpretation is that Spinoza does paint just such a picture. But 
many scholars are now rethinking this old-fashioned view and interpreting the free man as 
someone who tries to understand rather than extirpate his emotions. See, for example, Tucker 
(2015), Nadler (2015), and Youpa (2010). 
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I conclude that grasping the aspects of both necessitarianism and human freedom that I 
have discussed in this chapter are crucial to understanding Spinoza's arguments about 
understanding and active suffering, which are the subjects of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six:  
Active Suffering: An Examination of Spinoza's Approach to Dealing With One's 
Experience of Pain  
Grasping the relationship between necessity and freedom enables a person to realize how 
important it is to engage with all of her experiences, even the painful ones. It enables her to 
realize this because, as Spinoza never tires of pointing out, there is a strong relationship between 
knowledge and activity. Knowing things (as well as the way in which things are known) is 
closely related to doing things.  
It is this connection between knowledge and activity that makes it possible for a person to 
know the way she should deal with her experience of pain, or, as I like to put it, the way for her 
to suffer actively. And actively dealing with pain is the same thing as being free. My purpose in 
this chapter is to show how understanding her pain–rather than trying to escape it–enables a 
person, while she's in the midst of experiencing it, to be active and in this way to be free.  
To show this, I devote much of this chapter to examining the ways that, according to 
Spinoza, a person knows things. Two of these ways–the rational and the intuitive–produce 
adequate ideas, so I focus on them. That is not to say, though, that they are equally effective. It 
turns out that knowing things intuitively is superior to knowing them rationally. I also devote 
much of the chapter to analyzing Spinoza's teaching that a person should apply this knowledge to 
her experiences of pain. Here also intuitive knowledge is shown to be superior. I show in the last 
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section the way knowledge relates to activity, the way they both relate to active suffering, and the 
identity of active suffering and freedom. 
Three Ways of Knowing Things  
In order to deal properly with her experience of pain, says Spinoza, a person should  
improve her understanding or knowledge of it, of necessity, and of things in general. What is it to 
understand something, though? Recall from Chapter 1 that to understand something or to have 
knowledge about it is the same as to form an idea of it. But the idea in question cannot be fuzzy 
and confused (i.e. what Spinoza calls an inadequate idea); it has to be clear and distinct (i.e. what 
he calls an adequate idea). So to understand something is to form an adequate idea of it.  How, 171
then, does a person form adequate ideas? She does it by increasing her knowledge. But it has to 
be the right sort of knowledge.  
Recall again from Chapter 1 that Spinoza arranges understanding or knowledge 
hierarchically.  The first type is opinion (opinio), which describes the natural way humans 172
know things. Because it is based on imagination, prejudice, and superstition, it is inadequate and 
 There is a strong relationship here between adequacy and activity. Knowing something 171
clearly and distinctly is obviously similar to using one's power to act. This similarity highlights the 
relationship between understanding and active suffering, which will be discussed later in more 
detail.  
 Spinoza's teaching about the three types  of knowledge is akin to Nietzsche's three 172
metamorphoses of the spirit (from camel to lion to child; cf. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part 1) and 
to Kierkegaard's three stages of human existence (from slave to knight of infinite resignation to 
knight of faith; cf. Fear and Trembling, Part 2). All three are similar to the Zen Buddhist parable 
about a monk who first sees mountains only as mountains, then learns to see them not as 
mountains at all, then realizes that they are indeed mountains but are also much more. The 
progress in each of these examples is from a reliance on sense experience to a focus on the 
universal to a realization of reality's nature. 
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so false; it is for this reason the lowest type. The second type is reason (ratio), which describes a 
person's forming an intellectual conception of things. Because it is based on conceiving universal 
properties, it is adequate and so true. Yet there are limitations to it; it is for this reason not the 
highest type. The third type of knowledge is intuition (scientia intuitiva), which describes a 
person's knowing the essences of things. Because it is based on conceiving individual properties 
rather than universal ones, Spinoza considers it not only both adequate and true but also the 
highest type of knowledge.  
Given that opinion, the first type of knowledge, is inadequate (and hence leads people to 
understand things falsely), examining it closely is not useful for our purpose of showing the way 
Spinoza thinks that a person should deal with her experience of pain. But both reason and 
intuition, the second and third types of knowledge, are adequate (and hence lead people to 
understand things accurately), so examining them closely is useful. But, as I pointed out, 
reasoning about something and knowing it intuitively do not produce equal forms of knowledge. 
Because it enables a person to know what things really are (rather than to know just information 
about things), intuition is superior to reason. But it is a mistake to think that a person can "skip 
over" reasoning about things and go from knowing them by opinion to knowing them intuitively. 
Knowledge doesn't work that way.  There are steps to understanding things, and taking one step 
is necessary for taking another. A person naturally has opinions about things. She improves her 
understanding by learning to know them first rationally and then intuitively. Although they are 
not equal, both reason and intuition do produce adequate knowledge. For this reason, they 
deserve our close attention.  
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Knowing Things Rationally  
As we just saw, humans naturally know things when those things affect their 
imaginations; this type of knowing produces false or inadequate ideas. The reason it does so is 
that it is a passive sort of knowing. It is not really knowing at all, in fact, but, because a person's 
thinking is determined by things that are external to her, is instead like looking at things "as mute 
pictures on a panel" (2p49s2). When a person knows something in this way, she is not thinking 
for herself but is relying on the opinions of others to form her ideas. When she stops relying on 
opinion and starts thinking for herself, however, she has made the transition to understanding or 
knowing things rationally. This type of knowing is active, since a person is determined only by 
things (thoughts and feelings, in this case) that are internal to her. So it produces true or adequate 
ideas.  
We know from Chapter 1 that an idea is adequate if it is complete in itself, if it perfectly 
describes its object without having to refer to anything else.  In a letter to Tschirnhaus, Spinoza 173
gives the example of the idea of a circle. The idea is adequate, he says, if a person can deduce 
from it all the properties of a circle. (Letter LX) Yet the capacity to form adequate ideas is not 
specific to reason. How does a person form adequate ideas by reasoning about things? Spinoza 
says that she does it "from the fact that [humans] have common notions and adequate ideas of 
 Spinoza was influenced here by Aristotle's developing the term "definition" in his 173
Metaphysics. An adequate idea just is an expression of an object's definition. 
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properties of things" (2p40s2).  In other words, a person reasons about a thing–thus forming an 174
adequate idea of it–by having a common notion of its properties.    175
What makes a notion common, Spinoza writes in 2p38, is that it is something that all 
things share: "Those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the 
whole, can only be conceived adequately." He gives the example of motion and rest , and other 176
examples that he has mentioned before are thought and extension . Notions are also common if 177
all things of a certain type share them. Spinoza gives the example in 2p39 of human beings, who 
share characteristics with all other members of their species: "If something is common to, and 
peculiar to, the human body and certain external bodies by which the human body is usually 
affected, and is equally in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate 
 Although Spinoza wrote in his earlier works about many aspects of epistemology that he later 174
developed in the Ethics, common notions are an exception. Even his treatment of them here is 
scant. Possibly, he never fully worked out this theory.
 In fact, he says in the previous scholium that common notions are "the foundations of 175
reason." 
 See 2d2: All things are similar in that "they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, 176
and absolutely, that now they move, now they are at rest."
 In other words, attributes are counted among common notions. Marshall (2008) suggests 177
that infinite modes should be included as well. 
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in the mind." The same is logically true of every other species  and ushers into Spinoza's 178
approach to attaining knowledge what Delahunty (2010) calls an "empirical element."  179
Rational Knowledge and Pain   
As we saw in Chapter 4, Spinoza says in 2p29s that the mind forms adequate ideas when 
it "considers a number of things at once, to understand their agreements, differences, and 
oppositions." And we have just seen that the mind uses reason to form these adequate ideas by 
applying common notions to the things in question. In other words, a person reasons about 
something by applying what she knows about things in general (i.e. her knowledge of common 
notions) to that thing in particular.  And applying common notions includes knowing the ways 180
 Common notions are characteristics that things–both things in general and things of a 178
specific type–share in common. Given panpsychism, all living beings–not just humans–can 
have common notions. See 2p13s: "The things we have shown so far are completely general 
and do not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different 
degrees, are nevertheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of 
which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human body." Because every 
being is a mode of substance, each is conscious to a degree. Some though like humans have a 
more complex and developed capacity to reason than others. It is a difference in quantity, not in 
quality.
 Delahunty is specifically concerned to show that Spinoza's common notions are not at all like 179
the innate ideas of Descartes and Leibniz. In contrast, some scholars, such as Allison (1987), 
argue that the relationship between common notions and innate ideas is quite strong. The 
question, I think, comes down to this: if all beings can, to some degree, have common notions, 
are these notions similar to innate ideas? In line with their rationalism, Descartes and Leibniz 
thought that God had placed certain ideas into a person's  mind so that they were innate to her. 
(A contemporary version is nativism, which holds that the brain is structured in such a way that 
ideas must be innate to it. For a look at nativism within the context of the historical debate over 
innate ideas, see Stamet [2008]). It is true that Spinoza's common notions are in a sense innate, 
both because they are shared by every being and because every being is a mode of substance. 
But, from the very fact that they are not universal only among humans, it follows that they, unlike 
innate ideas, have to be formed in order to become notions. This fact suggests that Spinoza's 
philosophy contains elements of both empiricism and rationalism. 
 Note that applying common notions is in this way the basis of scientific thinking. 180
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in which that thing is both the same as and different from other things as well as how it is 
causally connected to everything else (i.e. understanding its necessity).  
For our purposes here, the particular thing to which common notions are being applied is 
the affect that Spinoza calls tristitia.   So the question is, how should a person apply common 181
notions to her experience of pain? Quite simply, she should apply her general knowledge of what 
pain is and how it works to the particular instance. We saw in Chapter 3 that such common 
notions about pain include a knowledge of pain's nature, of the way it functions in the body, of its 
causes and effects, of the ways people perceive it and conceptualize it, of its place in the field of 
ethics. And we saw in Chapter 4 that knowledge about pain must include knowledge about the 
way in which it is causally connected to every other event (I.e. about its necessity).  
If I sprain my ankle, for instance, knowing about my pain in these ways offers me as 
much control over the situation as possible. To an extent, I do not passively receive pain but am 
rather in charge of my experience. And being in charge enables me to respond instead of react.  182
It is I and not my pain who is in control of my experience, so I can breathe and calmly figure out 
how to treat my injury and deal with my pain instead of just screaming due to being hurt and 
 See 5p4s: "We can devise no other remedy for the affects which depends on our power and 181
is more excellent than this, which consists in a true knowledge of them. For the mind has no 
other power than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas."
 Of course initially reacting to something is only natural for any being. That I jump when 182
startled, turn my head when called by name, and scream when hurt and afraid are instinctive 
reactions over which I have no control. The same is true of other beings. But the point is that 
these reactions are natural only at first. They are unnatural when they are extended. It is 
instructive that no other animal dwells on its pain the way many humans do  Reactions should 
be distinguished from responses, which are thoughtful deliberations about what to do next. 
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afraid.  Treating one's injury and dealing with one's pain are, as we saw in Chapter 3, two 183
different things. Because pain itself is so multifaceted, a person understands her experience of 
pain only when she understands the things and events relating to it. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
Spinoza thinks that any bit of understanding  (i.e. adequate knowledge) increases a person's 
power and so so her ability to deal properly with her affects.  Yet we also saw that she deals 184
best with those affects when they themselves are the objects of her understanding. A case in point 
is 5p4s, where Spinoza writes that "each of us has, in part at least, if not absolutely–the power to 
understand himself and his affects, and consequently, the power to bring it about that he is less 
acted on by them." That I sprain my ankle is one event in a causal nexus that encompasses 
everything that has ever happened as well as everything that will ever happen. Getting to know 
as much as I can about these things–especially the ones that relate more immediately to the 
spraining–helps me deal with my particular experience. And understanding the causal nexus as a 
whole enables me to realize that it is necessary and that wishing it away would be both pointless 
and against the grain of life itself.  185
Spinoza clearly thinks that reasoning about things is important. As we just saw, he holds 
that it is necessary for a person to acquire rational knowledge in order to deal with her 
experience of pain. Acquiring rational knowledge is necessary because having adequate ideas is 
 Note the similarity here to my argument in Chapter 3 against pity. Rational deliberation and 183
action is a proper response to pain, whether I am or someone else is experiencing the pain. 
 In the same way, Rutherford (2008) argues that what Spinoza calls the "dictates of reason" 184
are not normative principles but simply results of the mind's having adequate ideas. 
 What I mean by this will be explained fully in the next section. Suffice it for now to say that, 185
as necessary, pain has a place in life. To wish away pain is to make the mistake of wishing away 
a part life. 
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necessary for dealing with pain. And, by applying common notions to particular things, reason 
produces adequate ideas. Yet, precisely because this is the way it produces adequate ideas, reason 
has its limits. Spinoza points this out in 4p17s by advising us to "know both our nature’s power 
and its lack of power, so that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects, and 
what it cannot do." Reason can do a lot to enable a person to deal with her experience of pain. 
But it cannot do everything.  
Spinoza points to akrasia as the problem infecting rational knowledge.  An Ancient 186
Greek word meaning "lack of strength" (α + κρατος) and is usually translated as "incontinence" 
or "lacking self-control," akrasia was used by ancient philosophers  to describe a person's 187
acting against her better judgement. Most philosophers interpreted this acting as a conflict 
between reason and passion , but medieval thinkers, in keeping with their introduction of the 188
concept "will" into philosophical discourse, began instead to treat the state of acting against one's 
better judgement as weakness of the will. Early modern philosophers such as Descartes 
 See 5pref: "Man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects I call Bondage. For the 186
man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune, in whose power 
he so greatly is that often, though he sees the better for himself, he is still forced to follow the 
worse." Although Spinoza does not actually use the term akrasia, it is clear from his description 
of the conflict between reason and passion that he is referring to this concept. 
 Akrasia is not merely a problem for the ancients. There has been much discussion of it 187
recently in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and even neuroscience. A particular topic of 
discussion is its relation to self-deception, since doing the opposite of what I know I ought to do 
amounts to deceiving myself. For different takes on this issue, see Rorty (1986), Pears (1984), 
and Mele (1987). 
 Some philosophers, such as Plato, interpreted it instead as a lack of knowledge. In the 188
dialogue Protagoras, Socrates says that a person would choose not to follow the best course of 
action only if she did not have sufficient knowledge about what the best course was. Since he 
was an optimistic rationalist, he did not consider that a person's emotions could dissuade her 
from what she knew to be the best course . 
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continued in  attributing akrasia to a faculty responsible for making decisions, which they also 
called the will.  
As we have seen several times, Spinoza rejects the notion that the mind contains a 
separate faculty charged with making decisions. He holds instead that every choice a person 
makes is representational: it is an idea like any other. His account of akrasia, then, has much in 
common with that of the ancient Greeks, for he also thinks that it is a conflict of judgements.  189
More specifically, Spinoza sees it as a conflict between rational ideas and passionate ideas. 
Akrasia takes place in a person when ideas derived from her passive affects become more 
powerful than ideas derived from her reason.   190
A thing's power, as we saw in Chapter 2, is its capacity to be the cause of effects (i.e. to 
cause stuff to happen). A situation is akratic if a person's passionate idea is better than her 
rational idea at causing her to do something. An example is a student's desire to play a computer 
game being more efficacious than her decision to write her term paper. In terms of experiencing 
pain, an example is a person's urge to be a passive recipient of her pain having greater causal 
effect than her choice to deal actively with it. This inner conflict arises because a person can only 
 See 4p17s: "With this I believe I have shown the cause why men are moved more by opinion 189
than by true reason, and why the true knowledge of good and evil arouses disturbances of the 
mind, often yields to lust of every kind. Hence that verse of the Poet: '...video meliora, proboque, 
detoriora sequor...'" Spinoza here quotes Ovid's Metamorphoses VII, 20-21. Famously, Medea 
is torn between her passion for Jason and reason's demand that she should remain loyal to her 
father. 
 See Lin (2006) and Marshall (2010) for discussions of the way Spinoza explains akrasia as 190
being both a cognitive and an affective matter. 
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go so far in knowing things rationally.  That is why there is for Spinoza another, final level of 191
knowledge.  
Knowing Things Intuitively  
According to Spinoza, akrasia infects rational knowledge due to the way such knowledge 
produces adequate ideas. It produces them by applying common notions to particular things, 
which is an abstract, detached way of producing adequate ideas. But it is not the only way of 
doing so. Knowing things in a rational way and being led by passion are two motivations for 
committing an action that necessarily conflict, and passion often wins. That is why Spinoza 
wants reason to become an affect.  When it does so, knowing things ceases to be about 192
abstracting away from them and becomes instead about engaging with them. A person still 
produces adequate ideas by acquiring knowledge about things, but she has progressed from 
doing this by acquiring rational knowledge to doing it by acquiring intuitive knowledge.  193
 See 4p15: "A desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be 191
extinguished or restrained by many other desires which arise from affects by which we are 
tormented."
 See 4p14: "No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is 192
true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect." Recall the discussion in Chapter 2 of what 
scholars call "affective reason." I argue in the following paragraphs that it is what Spinoza calls 
"intuitive knowledge."
 In 2p40s2, Spinoza gives a famous example of knowing a thing intuitively and of how doing 193
that differs from knowing a thing rationally: "Suppose there are three numbers, and the problem 
is to find a fourth which is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to 
multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first, because they have not yet 
forgotten what they heard from their teacher without any demonstration, or because they have 
often found this in the simplest numbers, or from the force of the Demonstration of P7 in Bk. VII 
of Euclid, viz. from the common property of proportionals. But in the simplest numbers none of 
this is necessary. Given the numbers 1, 2, and 3, no one fails to see what the fourth proportional 
number is and we see this much more clearly because we infer the fourth number from the ratio 
which, in one glance, we see the first number to have the second.
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Spinoza says in 2p40s that intuitive knowledge proceeds "from an adequate idea of the 
formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things." 
Recall from Chapter 1 that God's attributes are his essences, i.e. what it really is. Modes are the 
ways in which God exists, and they express themselves through his attributes. Knowing things 
intuitively, then, requires knowing what God really is.  
What I'm calling "what God really is," Spinoza refers to as "the essence of God." He uses 
this term to signify the unity of all things that exist.  As we saw in Chapter 1, Spinoza points to 194
this unity many times as the oneness of God, his attributes, and his modes.  This is the reason 195
Spinoza emphasizes that it is possible for a person to have an idea of something only if that thing 
(or whatever makes it up) actually exists. And that a thing exists means that it is a part of God. 
So having an idea of any thing is like having an idea of God's essence. Spinoza says this in 2p45: 
"Each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves an 
eternal and infinite essence of God.” 
Although it is true that an inadequate idea is also based on God's essence, it is 
nevertheless a confused and fuzzy idea.  Only if the idea is adequate does it do a proper job of 
representing God's essence. "The knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence, which each 
idea involves," writes Spinoza, "is adequate and perfect." Moreover, because humans are parts of 
God, each one has adequate idea of this essence: "The human mind has an adequate knowledge 
 See 2p3s: "God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself, that is, just 194
as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as everyone maintains unanimously) that 
God understands himself, with the same necessity it also follows that God does infinitely many 
things in infinitely many modes."
 Fløistad (1972) points out that this unity (and particularly its function in intuitive knowledge) is 195
analogous to the unity of thought and extension or mind and body.
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of God’s eternal and infinite essence." (2p47)  Once again, to exist is to be a part of this 196
substantial unity. By knowing what God really is, a person intuitively knows what things really 
are.  
But intuitive knowledge doesn't proceed in a straight line from the essence of God to the 
essences of things. Recall from Chapter 1 that the modes of God do not fall only under the 
category of finite things. They also include infinite modes, whose function it is to mediate 
between Substance and its finite modes. Spinoza calls the infinite mode by which God forms an 
idea of his essence as well as of everything that follows from this essence the "infinite intellect" 
or "idea of God."   And we just saw that humans possess the same capacity to form an idea of 197
God.  So intuitive knowledge proceeds from knowing what God really is, through knowing the 198
infinite intellect, to knowing the finite modes.  
This suggests that intuitive knowledge involves an inferential process. To infer something 
is to acquire knowledge about that thing from another thing. In the case of intuitive knowledge, a 
person infers knowledge about a particular thing from knowledge about God.  And, due to its 
 Spinoza continues in the Scholium: "From this we see that God’s infinite essence and his 196
eternity are known to all. And since all things are in God and are conceived through God, it 
follows that we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know 
adequately, and so can form the third kind of knowledge." This is not necessarily true only of the 
human mind, given the fact that every existing thing–by virtue of the very fact that it does exist–
is a part of God. Hence Spinoza's panpsychism. Just as every being is conscious to a degree, 
so every being has at least some knowledge of God. Spinoza is clearly focusing in these 
passages on the human mind. As we saw in Chapter 2, however, varying degrees of both 
cognition and consciousness should also be attributed to non-human animals, plants, and all 
other existing objects. 
 Recall from Chapter 1 that to form an idea of something is to represent that thing to oneself. 197
So the infinite intellect is literally the result of God representing himself to himself. 
 Spinoza makes the point again in 2p7c: "What is contained objectively in the intellect must 198
necessarily be in nature."
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divine nature, this process is direct and immediate.  When a person knows something 199
intuitively, she does so instantaneously. As Spinoza points out in the mathematical example 
quoted earlier, knowing a thing intuitively is like a merchant's inferring the correct sum "in one 
glance.” 
There is controversy among scholars over the relationship between intuitive and rational 
knowledge. In 2p46d Spinoza says that "...what gives knowledge of an eternal and infinite 
essence of God is common to all and is equally in the part and in the whole. And so this 
knowledge will be adequate." Some scholars  misinterpret Spinoza as categorizing the idea of 200
God (which is the foundation of intuitive knowledge) as one of the common notions (which are 
the foundations of rational knowledge). Doing this introduces the problem of distinguishing 
between the bases of rational knowledge and intuitive knowledge. But the context of the passage 
tells us that Spinoza is once again making it clear that everyone contains within herself the stuff 
that enables a person to know things intuitively. It is just that not everyone uses this stuff 
properly. Recall Spinoza's saying in 2p40s2 that common notions are of "properties of things." 
Since the idea of God is not the property of a thing, it cannot be a common notion. So there is in 
fact no problem distinguishing the basis of rational knowledge (common notions) from the basis 
of intuitive knowledge (idea of God). 
 In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes distinguishes between deduction and 199
intuition. While the former is characterized by rational steps, the latter takes place in one fell 
swoop. Spinoza was clearly influenced by this distinction, since he describes intuitive 
knowledge in a similar way. For more on the inferential nature of intuitive knowledge, see 
Garrett (2009).
 One example is Schliesser (2011). Garrett (2009) does a good job of outlining the arguments 200
on both sides of this debate.
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The process by which a person knows a thing intuitively is different on a fundamental 
level from the process by which she knows it rationally. Carr (1978) calls the difference one of 
"ordering." With intuitive knowledge, a person proceeds from cause (adequate idea of God) to 
effect (adequate idea of things). With rational knowledge, on the other hand, the order is 
reversed. A person proceeds from effect to cause. In other words, both sorts of knowledge 
involve having an adequate idea of God. In the case of rational knowledge, learning about stuff 
(which requires applying common notions to particular things) results in acquiring this idea. In 
the case of intuitive knowledge, however, a person has this idea to begin with and, because she 
has it, has an automatic idea of each particular thing as well. 
Intuitive Knowledge and Pain  
As we just saw, a person knows something intuitively by applying her knowledge of what 
God really is to that thing. The thing in this case is a person's experience of pain or the affect 
Spinoza calls tristitia. But a person cannot apply her knowledge of what God really is to her 
experience of pain in the same way that she can apply common notions to that same experience. 
In the case of rational knowledge, she begins by knowing in general what pain is and how it 
works. She then applies this general knowledge to her particular experience. In the case of 
intuitive knowledge, however, she begins in a way with her particular experience.  That is, she 201
knows instantaneously what her own pain is and how it works by knowing what God really is 
(i.e. the unity of everything). Knowing her own pain intuitively, as opposed to knowing it 
 Note the similarity between Carr's "ordering" (mentioned above) and my explanation of 201
knowing pain rationally versus knowing it intuitively. 
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rationally, gives her a direct and immediate knowledge of pain's nature, of the way it functions in 
the body, of its causes and effects, of the ways people perceive it and conceptualize it, of its place 
in the field of ethics, and of the way in which it is causally connected to every other event (i.e. of 
its necessity).  
Knowing my own pain intuitively not only enables me to have such general knowledge of 
pain but also gives me control over and enables me to respond actively to situations like 
spraining my ankle. It does this by making it possible for me to engage with my experience. To 
engage with something is to become involved in it or to interact with it. I engage with my pain 
when I know it inside out, so to speak. This means that pain is neither just a sensation (as it is in 
the case of opinion) nor just something that I know about (as it is in the case of rational 
knowledge). Pain is still something that I know, but, since my way of knowing is now intuitive, I 
know it more completely.  My mind and body no longer function as independent entities that 202
potentially oppose each other (as they do in the cases of the akrasia that infects rational 
knowledge). They now work as a seamless whole to deal with such painful situations as my 
spraining my ankle.  
Of course, I don't mean to suggest that the body knows something in the same way that 
the mind does. I can say "I sprained my ankle," because, based on the signals it received from my 
brain, my mind has reached that conclusion. My body has also reached that conclusion; it just 
doesn't express this reaching in the same way that my mind does. We saw in Chapter 3 that 
damage to one part of the body is communicated to other parts through the process of 
 Saying that knowing something intuitively enables a person to deal with her affects is thus 202
the same thing as saying that reason can win against passion (the opposite of what happens in 
cases of akrasia) so long as that reason is complete.
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nociception. This is the way my body knows that I've sprained my ankle. Instead of 
communicating the thought "I've sprained my ankle," my body reacts to the news by increasing 
my heart rate, making my breathing shallow, tensing my muscles, and causing me to turn red. 
Both body and mind are really doing the same thing; they are just doing it in different ways. In 
Spinoza's terms, mind and body are working in parallel. And the point of parallelism, as we saw 
in Chapter 1, is that there is in fact no difference between mind's functioning and body's 
functioning. There is just functioning. All things work as a seamless whole, and it is only by 
transitioning from knowing them rationally to knowing them intuitively that a person can realize 
this fact. 
As with rational knowledge, I realize that a painful event like spraining my ankle is 
necessary and that wishing it away would be both pointless and against the grain of life itself. 
But I no longer know this by means of knowing it rationally. Now I realize it by intuitively 
knowing the pain involved in spraining my ankle. And intuitively knowing that one event means 
knowing that it is not one event at all but is rather interdependent with all other events. It means 
knowing that my spraining my ankle  is an inseparable part of the causal nexus, of the seamless 203
whole, of the unity that Spinoza calls "God."  
And it means not only accepting or putting up with this fact but even loving it and 
wanting it to be the case.  Bound up with knowing something intuitively, says Spinoza, is 204
loving life in its entirety, the painful and the joyful parts equally. Spinoza calls this love of 
 It is useful to think of this one event as bearing the same relation to all other events that a 203
molecule of water bears to all bodies of water. We saw similar examples in Chapter 4.
 See 4app: "Insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary." Note 204
that he uses the active "want" and not the passive "accept."
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necessity that is generated by knowing the essences of things the "intellectual love of 
God" (amor dei intellectualis).  Spinoza here combines love–a bodily passion–with intellect–a 205
concept signifying the mental power used to acquire knowledge–in order to show the importance 
of embracing life.  Intuitive knowledge is in this way like the concept of affective reason that 206
we looked at in Chapter 3. A person transforms reason into an affect (in much the same way that 
she transitions from knowing things rationally to knowing things intuitively) for the purpose of 
embracing her experience of pain. We should notice that Spinoza does not distinguish this 
intellectual love of God from what he calls "blessedness." In 5p36s, he writes that blessedness 
consists in "a constant and eternal love of God." Bennett (1984) explains that "Spinoza wants 
'blessedness' to stand for the most elevated and desirable state one could possibly be in." And this 
state amounts to embracing the unity of all things. Loving God (the action, not just the result), 
which means wanting to experience one's pain , is the same thing as being blessed.  207
 The similarity between Spinoza's teaching of amor dei intellectualis and Nietzsche's amor fati 205
is rearkable. In fact, philosophers such as Yovel (1983) argue that the latter is but a slight 
modification of the former. Of course, as we have seen, the philosophies of Spinoza and 
Nietzsche are similar in general. In particular, though, both these doctrines take a positive and 
even enthusiastic approach towards the necessity of everything that exists. Compare Spinoza's 
teaching with Nietzsche's, as he describes in Section 10 of Ecce Homo: "My formula for 
greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not 
backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it—all 
idealism is mendacity in the face of what is necessary—but to love it."
 To get the order straight, it is helpful to look at the pattern of definition. Recall from Chapter 2 206
that Spinoza defines love as "a joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause" (3def6). In 
5p32c, he defines the intellectual love of God as "joy, accompanied by the idea of God as its 
cause." We just saw that the idea of God is the result of God's representing himself to himself. 
For a discussion of the way intellectual love of God fits with Spinoza's definition of love in 
general, see Melamed (forthcoming).
 Nadler (2016) points out that a person's having an intellectual love of God affects all other 207
aspects of her life. That it does makes sense, because the object of this love–the unity of 
everything–is a  seamless whole. 
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The Relationship Between Knowledge, Activity, and Freedom  
A person's acquisition of either rational or intuitive knowledge as well as her application 
of this knowledge to her experience of pain is strongly related to her level of activity.  Recall 208
from Chapter 2 that whether a person's affect is active or passive depends on the way it 
influences her power of acting. The more it increases her power of acting (i.e. the more powerful 
it enables her to become), the more active it is. The more it decreases her power of acting (i.e. the 
less powerful it makes her), the more passive it is.  
Another way to explain activity/passivity draws on the discussion of adequacy found in 
Chapter 1 and in the previous sections on knowledge. Note that this explanation changes the 
subject of activity from a person's affect to the person herself. This really isn't a change at all, 
however, since a person's affects make her in part who she is. Spinoza says in 3d2 that "we are 
passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our 
nature externally, we being only the partial cause" but that we are active "when anything takes 
place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause." And by adequate 
cause he means "a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived" (3d1). I 
am active if I, all by myself (i.e. with no outside help), cause a thing to happen. This thing can be 
either internal to me (e.g. a feeling I have) or external to me (e.g. weights that I lift). And the 
only way I can cause this thing to happen is by thinking clearly about it (by applying either 
 There has been controversy among scholars concerning Spinoza's presentation in two 208
different works of the active/passive nature of knowledge. In the Short Treatise, he presents 
knowledge as passive. In the Ethics, however, knowledge becomes something active and 
autonomous. For a discussion of this debate, see Mignini (1986). 
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common notions or the idea of God to it) and in this way coming to know what it really is. 
Spinoza would say that a person's being active depends on her knowing such things adequately. 
As we just saw, there are two ways of acquiring such adequate knowledge about things: 
the rational way and the intuitive way. Even though both types of knowledge produce adequate 
ideas about things, however, we have seen that intuitive knowledge allows for a greater level of 
activity than does rational knowledge. In other words, a person is more active if she knows 
something intuitively than if she knows it rationally. The reason is that knowing things intuitively 
amounts to knowing their essences, and knowing a thing's essence amounts to knowing that thing 
completely. And, as we just noted, the better a person knows something, the greater is her power 
of acting. Hence the more active she is. She in this way transcends the division between mind 
and body or, as in cases of akrasia, between what she knows she ought to do and what she feels 
like doing.  
Because it reflects the convergence of thinking and acting, Spinoza's emphasis on the 
relationship between knowledge and activity is crucial to understanding his approach to 
suffering. Knowing things, because it makes her active, enables a person to deal with her 
experiences of pain. But, as we have seen, there are better and worse ways of dealing with these 
experiences. It is not just the fact that a person knows things, but also the way she knows them 
that determines how well she deals with pain. Since the intuitive way of knowing things is better 
than the rational way at producing adequate ideas and hence at causing a person's level of 
activity to increase, the intuitive way is also better than the rational way at enabling a person to 
deal with her experience of pain. As we saw in the last section, it is better because it means 
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knowing things completely and loving life (i.e. the interactions among things) by embracing its 
necessity.  
Doing these things while experiencing pain is what it means to suffer actively. There are 
two ways for a person to suffer (i.e. to deal with her experience pain): either passively or 
actively. She suffers passively when she doesn't deal directly with her pain but tries either to 
distract herself from it (as in cases of opinion) or to resign herself to it (as in cases of rational 
knowledge). A person suffers actively, however, when she does deal directly with her pain by 
knowing it inside out and embracing it as a part of life.  
Note that loving life and embracing pain as a part of life do not amount to the same thing 
as loving one's experience of pain. It is not enjoyable to experience pain, and it never will be. 
Pain is by definition unpleasant. As Spinoza would put it, tristitia always decreases one's power 
of acting.  Recall from chapter 3 that Spinoza considers it our duty to take away others' pain 209
and even, where possible, to prevent it. A person should suffer actively only when it is necessary 
for her to suffer at all. The object of her amor should not be pain itself but life as a whole. In 
other words, a person should love and want pain only insofar as it is a necessary part of life. 
When a person suffers actively in the face of necessary pain, she is free. Note that 
freedom is not some reward achieved in the end after years of suffering. A person does not suffer 
so that she can one day be free. Rather, her suffering actively just is her being free. Recall from 
Chapter 4 that, because all events happen necessarily, freedom cannot be based on the concept of 
free will but can exist only within the bounds of necessity. So a  person is free only if she 
 For this reason, tristitia itself can never be made active. Most scholars have pointed this out. 209
See Schmitter (2014) for a comprehensive discussion. Though it is impossible to make tristitia 
active, the way we deal with pain both can and should be made active.
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internally determines herself to act from her own nature.  This identity of freedom and active 210
suffering–the fact that a person's suffering actively is the same thing as her being free–suggests 
that it is not possible for a person to be free from experiencing pain.  It is possible only for her 211
to be free in the midst of experiencing pain.  
I conclude that, according to Spinoza, knowing things clearly enables a person to be 
active. So knowing things clearly enables her to deal with her pain or to suffer actively. And 
knowing things intuitively is the most effective way of enabling her to do this. By knowing 
things in this way she is free.  
 We have seen multiple times that the nature of all humans is to know things. As regards 210
dealing with pain, then, a person acts from her nature when she knows her pain inside out and, 
in doing so, embraces the necessity inherent in life  
 Of course , it is possible for her pain to be taken away or prevented. But, given Spinoza's 211
unique version of freedom, that is not the same as her being free from pain.
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Chapter Seven: 
A Conclusion  
In this dissertation, I addressed an area of Spinoza scholarship that is important but has 
unfortunately been neglected: the role that tristitia plays in Spinoza's philosophy as well as the 
way he thinks humans should deal with their experiences of it. They should deal with them, I 
argued, by knowing things adequately, which means knowing them either rationally or 
intuitively. 
It became clear that, though necessary, knowing things adequately is not sufficient to deal 
with pain. Since pain is by nature both physical and psychological, affective knowledge–the act 
of knowledge becoming an affect–must be used. Using affective knowledge demands a level of 
particularity that rational knowledge, which is characterized by universality, cannot offer. Only 
intuitive knowledge can. Knowing things intuitively, I argued, is the best way for a person to deal 
with her experiences of pain.  
Dealing with pain by knowing things intuitively is what I called throughout this 
dissertation "suffering actively," a concept that is based on Spinoza's distinction between a 
passive thing (which an external force controls) and an active thing (which the subject herself 
controls). This concept takes for granted Spinoza's system of ethics and his conclusion that 
people are morally obligated to alleviate and prevent pain. This conclusion is important. But my 
argument took the perspective not of those who are able to do something about other beings' pain 
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but of those who have themselves to deal with pain. It centered around the idea that it is best for 
a person experiencing pain if she is the one who, as much as possible, is in control of these 
experiences. To be in control of them is what it means to suffer actively. And suffering actively 
is, I pointed out, the same thing as being free in the midst of experiencing pain, a concept based 
on Spinoza's definition of freedom as a person's internally determining herself to be in accord 
with necessity.  
In making these arguments, I examined in Chapter 1 Spinoza's systems of metaphysics 
and epistemology and in Chapter 2 his system of psychology. Special attention was paid to the 
identity of mind and body and the extension of this relationship to parallelism as well as to the 
affective nature of conatus and the activity/passivity of the affects in general. I took a close look 
in Chapter 3 at tristitia and in Chapter 4 at Spinoza's theory of freedom. Special attention was 
paid to the nature and context of pain as well as to a person's ability to be free in the midst of 
necessity by internally determining her actions. I drew everything together in Chapter 5 for the 
purpose of arguing that knowing things intuitively is the best way for humans to deal with their 
experiences of pain.  
But should this matter of dealing with pain pertain only to humans? I pointed out in 
Chapter 1 that, according to Spinoza's doctrine of panpsychism, all beings are conscious to a 
degree. I then pointed out in Chapter 2 that the human species does not, for Spinoza, constitute a 
"kingdom within a kingdom" and should be considered as one part of nature. And I pointed out 
in Chapter 3 that he thinks pain should be either alleviated or prevented as it regards all species, 
not just humans. It follows that this dissertation is only a beginning. It encourages research into 
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the ways that all beings suffer as well as the ways that their suffering can be either alleviated or 
prevented.   212
This dissertation also encourages further research into the affect that Spinoza calls tristitia 
as well as the use of intuitive vs. rational knowledge to deal with one's experience of it.  213
There's more. Such concepts as impermanence and interdependence are not only foundations of 
Spinoza's metaphysics but are foundations of Buddhist metaphysics as well. Also, a person's use 
of intuitive knowledge to guide her actions is an important part of Buddhist ethics. And her using 
intuition to gain awareness of any of her experiences–whether the pleasant or the unpleasant 
ones–is characteristic of the Buddhist practice known as mindfulness. Of course, a lot has been 
written about the connection between these Buddhist teachings and a person's experiences of 
pain.  But it would be useful, I think, to scholars both of Buddhism and of Spinozism, if 214
research were done into the remarkable similarities between these two philosophies.  
In sum, figuring out the best way for humans to deal with their experiences of pain is 
crucial to leading a good life. Because Spinoza is committed to helping humans lead such a life, 
he offers in the Ethics what he thinks is the best way for them to deal with their experiences of 
By "all beings" I clearly mean to include animals of other species. The relevant field of study 212
is cognitive ethology, in which De Waal (2016) writes about the cognitive abilities of primates 
and other animals. Braitman (2016) writes more specifically about the suffering of other species. 
These are but two examples; a lot of work is currently being done in this field. Less work–though 
more now than ever before–is being done in the field of plant intelligence. A good example is 
Wohlleben (2016), who devotes several chapters to the suffering undergone by trees. It should 
not be forgotten that vegetative beings constitute a no less valuable part of nature than humans 
and other animals do. 
 Excellent work has already been done in the area of intuitive vs. rational knowledge by 213
Soyarslan (2011) and (2013). But tristitia remains largely unexplored.
One excellent example is Nhat Hanh (2012), who writes about the relationship between 214
suffering and such metaphysical concepts as impermanence and interdependence. 
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pain. Though it is certainly not the only way to deal with these experiences, I am confident that 
following it will enable humans–especially those who have no choice but to experience pain–to 
lead a good life.  
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